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Foreword
IIASA, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Federal Forest Service,
in agreement with the Russian Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources,
signed agreements in 1992 and 1994 to carry out a large-scale study on the Siberian
forest sector. The overall objective of the study is to focus on policy options
that would encourage sustainable development of the sector. The goals are to as-
sess Siberia’s forest resources, forest industries, and infrastructure; to examine the
forests’ economic, social, and biospheric functions; with these functions in mind, to
identify possible pathways for their sustainable development; and to translate these
pathways into policy options for Russian and international agencies.
The first phase of the study concentrated on the generation of extensive and
consistent databases for the total forest sector of Siberia and Russia.
In its second phase, the study has encompassed assessment studies of the green-
house gas balances, forest resources and forest utilization, biodiversity and land-
scapes, non-wood products and functions, environmental status, transportation in-
frastructure, forest industry and markets, and socioeconomics.
This work, carried out by Dr. Michael Obersteiner at the International Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies, Vienna and IIASA deals with the development of the
sawmilling industry in Siberia.
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Chapter 1
Development of the analytical model
1.1 Introduction
Siberia’s forest sector is a topic which recently has gained considerable international inter-
est. IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis), the Russian Academy
of Sciences, and the Russian Federal Forest Service, in agreement with the Russian Min-
istry of the Environment and Natural Resources, signed agreements in 1992 and 1994 to
carry out a large-scale study on the Siberian forest sector. The overall objective of the
study is to focus on policy options that would encourage sustainable development of the
sector. The goals are to assess Siberia’s forest resources, forest industries, and infras-
tructure; to examine the forests’ economic, social, and biospheric functions; with these in
mind, to identify possible pathways for their sustainable development; and to translate
these pathways into policy options for Russian and international agencies.
The first phase of the study concentrated on the generation of extensive and consistent
databases of the total forest sector of Siberia and Russia.
The study has moved into its second phase, which will encompass assessment studies
of the greenhouse gas balance, forest resources and forest utilization, biodiversity and
landscapes, non-wood products and functions, environmental status, transportation in-
frastructure, forest industry and markets, and socio-economics.
The objective of this dissertation is to device a strategic modeling tool which could help
to develop comprehensive strategic plans for economic development of the forest sector
as a possible leading cluster of the Russian economy. Different modeling approaches will
enable detailed analysis of possible evolutions of the forest sector, based on which sensible
policy measures can be derived. The currently existing economic modeling tools seem to
be insufficient to adequately analyze the Siberian forest sector.
In particular I will try to construct a consistent analytic framework to give quantitative
answers to the following economic questions:
• What explains industrial output decline in the forest industry?
• What can be assumed to be realistic market scenarios?
• How may the geographic pattern of production evolve in the forest industry?
• What is the most likely future rate of employment?
• What happens with the production rate if product, production and transportation
prices change?
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• What can governmental policy interventions achieve?
It has to be noted, however, that the focus of this dissertation is to develop just an analytic
tool. It is not my intention to carry out the analysis as such. The scenarios featuring
the lumber industry 1 presented in section 4.1 only try to illustrate the sensitivity of the
model to changes in the model parameters and do by no means try to project any possible
real pattern of industry evolution. The application of this model can only be carried out
in a more integrative manner involving more knowledge and data from other researchers.
This dissertation has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter gives a brief
overview of the current status of the Siberian forest sector (section 1.2), the main prob-
lems of the sector are identified and formulated (section 1.3, and a modeling strategy is
developed to give answers to the main policy questions (section 1.4). In section 1.4 I
first review and give a critique of the existing modeling strategies currently being applied
in economic forest sector analysis (subsection 1.4.2) and in addition I give reasons why
a pure optimization strategy is not suitable in the context of the Siberian forest sector
(subsection 1.4.1). Finally, in subsection 1.4.3 I shortly describe the PSFIM and try to
put it into the framework of all other existing forest sector models and shortly review
the auction theoretic background which is done in subsections 1.4.4 and 1.4.5. The last
section in chapter 1, 1.5, is devoted to a non-technical and intuitive description of the
modeling approach. In chapter 2 I use simple mathematics to describe the structure of
the model. Here I distinguish between a static phase and a dynamic phase. The static
phase describes the auction mechanism, which is applied for each period, leading to a
partial market clearing depending on the producer and price constraints. In the dynamic
phase, product prices adjust, producers invest or depreciate capital, contract partners
revise contract policies and, finally, prices change according to the overall economic de-
velopment. In chapter 3 I describe two additional modules that are attached to the core
model described in chapter 2. The first module, described in section 3.1, ultimately de-
fines production and cost functions for harvesting and saw-milling operations. The second
section in chapter 3 first gives a methodological background for a Bayesian panel data
estimator 2 and in a second step demand functions are estimated for all export markets
relevant for the Siberian forest industry. In addition levels of domestic consumption are
discussed. Finally, chapter 4 gives a quantitative overview of the results of the modeling
exercise. I distinguish three different scenarios of agent behavior. The result of Scenario I
is illustrated on a GIS map. In chapter 5 I summarize the results and give some concluding
remarks.
1.2 Background
Since the collapse of the socialist system in 1991 Russia has committed itself to pro-
market reforms. The country is undergoing a transition period which is characterized by
the elimination of most state subsidies, decentralization of decision making, privatization
and the abolition of price and wage controls. The former tradition of soft budgets, which
guaranteed employment and low inflation, is abandoned.
1The model per se was constructed to analyze the entire forest industrial sector. The scenarios
presented in this dissertation, however, only illustrate the results gained for the lumber industry.
2This econometric method has never been developed before in the economic literature.
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Transition means at the enterprise level the elimination of non-competitive products and
radical changes in the ownership structure. This, combined with the collapse of the
COMECON and the Soviet Union markets, have caused a deep economic recession in all
of Russia and in the remote Siberian regions especially. The entire economy and the forest
sector have faced an unprecedented economic decline no country in modern history had
to experience. The decline started in 1989 - 1990 and still continues with the exceptions
for some export oriented enterprises or product lines. Some 50 % of industrial output in
real measures have been lost throughout the transition period (until 1993) in Russia.
The official rate of unemployment is rather low, but is in reality much higher. Hidden
unemployment will soon become apparent. Especially workers over forty are most effected
by the transition. Pensioners barely survive due to empty pension funds. The economic
down-turn has affected the most remote areas where most of the logging towns are located.
Visits to such towns give testimony to a very sad picture of the Russian psychological,
social and economic state.
Decline in real incomes and construction activities adversely affect the consumption of
forest products. Consumption will most likely be at a lower level at the turning of the
century than ten years ago. In this light most local expert opinions on future consump-
tion and production levels seem overestimated and remind us of the old five-year and five
hundred-days plans. Adoption of a new economic culture securing an efficient functioning
of markets will probably take generations. Well established Mafia networks and unreal-
istic profit and rent seeking by most managers feature the concerns of slow adaptation.
Economic problems are in Russia also connected with high political risks which in the
worst case may erupt in civil unrest due to the somewhat unfairly layered social structure
of society or the unrest may be connected with nationality conflicts. Such unforeseeable
events would of course destroy all scenario exercises.
The level and geographic distribution of forest sector output will mainly depend on two
factors. The first being the competitiveness of domestic wood working industries and the
second being the trade pattern. After the deep economic slump there are few enterprises
which are still competitive on domestic and international markets. Those who inherited
a decent working capital from the Soviet system are on the way to recover as recent
production figures show. For example pulp production in Ust-Illmsk has increased to an
production level, which is reaches 80% of capacity 3, which is unusually high for Russian
standards. However, a lot of other producers had to close down already and many more
will do so in the near future. To this latter group belong mainly producers which produce
low quality lumber and round-wood in remote areas.
Trade links with former Soviet satellite countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany,
and the Baltic countries have dried up. There is risk that forest products from Russia
will be absent in these markets for a long time. Future delivery of especially round-
wood from remote Siberian areas to European Russia will heavily depend on the future
of transportation costs. However, there are promising perspectives for timber and timber
products trade with some Former Soviet republics and countries with wood deficits in the
Pacific basin.
3The success of this particular producer can in part be explained by the fact that it belongs to a local
Mafia organization that has established an international network of sales offices.
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1.3 Problem formulation
Before we decide upon the type of analysis of industrial pattern formation we should make
clear,
• Whom are we going to address?
• What kind of questions can and should we answer given the current political and
economic conditions and the current state of information?
It is the aim of this research effort to develop a decision support tool for policy makers,
administrators of Russian and international governmental and non-governmental organi-
zations. Parts of the model should also be of interest to entrepreneurs being or potentially
being involved in the Forest sector of Siberia. It should be possible to conduct sensitivity
analysis with regards to different policy and business options.
Due to the effects of transition the Siberian forest industry has undergone an unprece-
dented production decline and suffered from financial and social hardship. Also ecological
problems were to a large extend ignored. At present it is entirely unclear how the entire
sector will evolve. Both industry and governmental organizations nationally and inter-
nationally have a vital interest in the well-being of the Siberian forests and its forest
industry. A number of development scenarios are possible at the moment. Although we
cannot anticipate future developments exactly it should be the aim of this research work
to develop a tool to visualize possible future scenarios depending on the different policy
options taken. This tool should allow the user to learn from the possible future. It is of
great importance to disseminate realistic from unrealistic scenarios for both demand and
supply. It should be possible to ask questions like ”What is likely to happen to the distri-
bution of roundwood production and its factor demands if markets under certain producer
conditions change”.
There are multiple criteria which the producers in the forest industry should fulfill. This
is the main reason why we resort to simulation rather to optimization in our analysis.
Optimization would mean that the analyst beforehand gives qualitative assessments to
the utility of certain functions, which in most cases can not be expressed by any kind of
agreeable market price. The prime function, most of the Siberian producers are dedicated
to, is to satisfy internal demand for the respective timber product grades. Certainly,
also social benefits such as employment, infrastructure maintenance, and revenue accu-
mulation should be guaranteed by production. This is especially important in remote
settlements where other employment is hardly existing. Another criterium is that, forest
ecosystems should be managed on a sustainable basis and logging operations should be
carried out with minimal long-term ecological impacts. However, in the present situation
of rather chaotic economic conditions managers of lespromhozes and timber mills put
high priority on their personal goals rather to expose themselves to the entire spectrum
of responsibilities they should in principle dedicate themselves.
Hence the most basic questions that need to be answered in one way or the other are the
following:
• What is the forest sector’s demand level for the factors
1. labor
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2. forest land (timber)
3. capital
4. energy
• What are the effects of changes in the factor prices?
• What happens if technology changes?
• What are the effects of changes in transportation costs?
• What are the competitive prices at different markets?
• What can governmental policy interventions do and what is the outcome of market
liberalization?
• What happens if demand changes?
• What are the most likely demand scenarios?
• How long will it take to reach a certain production level?
• What are the possible effects of different systems of forest management and envi-
ronmental regulations?
1.4 Modeling strategy
After having determined the set of questions to be answered we are now in the situation
to develop a tailored model. The model should help to visualize in a simplified way, the
possible future geographic pattern of production. The level of aggregation will be the
enterprises. Geographical information systems allow to see the effects of changes in the
producer system on the entire collection of enterprises without having to aggregate and
by this loosing some of the transparency of the analysis. The visual representation of
the results will give an indication of the geographic pattern of harvest, social hardship
and possible prosperity. The user will immediately be able to see how exogenous shocks
determine the geographic pattern of production. The results will indicate production sites
which will have to be abandoned whereas other regions will see new entry in the future.
The model developed is a strategic decision support system. It is fast to calculate and
simple in its logical structure. It is open in its design i.e. submodules can easily be
removed or added. The model is also flexible in the sense that the level of detail can
always be adjusted to the current state of knowledge and information and can eventually
be transformed into whatever optimization procedure if desired.
The users of the model should be able to conduct experiments. By observing the behavior
of the model during the experiments, the analyst is able to make inferences about the
possible behavior of the real world system. The restriction of the model to the optimal
outcome would have lead to a biased image of the real world system given the current
state of information.
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1.4.1 Simulation versus optimization
The strength of descriptive simulation 4 models in economics lies in the extent to which
they capture certain fundamental relationships apparent in market behavior without
putting too much structure a priory on the system at hand. Most of the pure eco-
nomic models adopt a neo-classical framework and assume well-functioning markets i.e.
perfect information, perfect competitive markets, profit maximization, zero transaction
costs, no externalities, no major policy distortions. Not a single criterium out of this
list of assumptions would be fair to apply to the current Russian situation. Moreover,
we are more after the question of how the possible future states of producers look like
rather than trying to tackle the question of optimal allocation and efficiency of theoretical
welfare outcomes.
First of all it is not even clear whether it would be fair to assume profit maximiza-
tion. Even if it were profit maximization, at the present moment it would be hard to
tell whether we face monopolists, oligopolists or agents under perfect competition which
maximize their profits. It seems for example to be more reasonable to adopt Baumol’s
view of maximizing market shares under zero profit conditions in the long run as the
behavioral paradigm of agents in transition economies. As we know from duality theory
under certain conditions cost minimization is identical to profit maximization. It is be-
lieved that these certain conditions again are violated and that this rigid framework has
to be loosened up a bit. Nevertheless, a cost limiting behavior as a behavioral goal of
any industrial manager should to some extend be build into our simulation model. This
can be justified by the fact that some enterprises are either subordinated units of a larger
integrated structure which would force the enterprise to run under minimum costs or a
free enterprise which needs to minimize its costs to stay in the market in order to fulfill its
particular goals and constraints whatever they are. The question is just to which extent
cost minimization takes place and how we should integrate this behavioral pattern in our
model. We did so by allowing the cost to fluctuate randomly in well defined boundaries.
On the other side of the market place also buyers will tend to minimize their costs. Buyers
will be willing to establish contracts with cheaper suppliers given similar quality. In this
sense we should use optimization and descriptive models together.
Secondly, taking into account the overall uncertain environment of the Russian economy
and more so the uncertain development of the roundwood market of Siberia it would be
difficult to justify a neo-classical equilibrium approach. An equilibrium solution would
fully describe the economy under the optimal allocation. Simulation models will only
yield certain indicators that describe some pattern of the economy. The solution of the
simulation outcome is not optimal, however, in our case be in a certain neighborhood of
the optimal state of the economy.
Another advantage of the simulation approach is that the simulation model which was
developed for the Siberian timber products market is easily comprehensible and is rela-
tively open to further extensions and can easily be adapted to integrate results of other
modeling results or analysis. In order to understand the core of what the model does it
is not a prerequisite to have an in depth knowledge in economic theory and there are no
black boxes which make a time constraint reader uncertain about the real functioning of
4Throughout the text I will use the word simulation synonymously for descriptive simulation in order
to stress the differences to optimization routines.
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the model and its implicit pitfalls. The model can also be extended to any detail depend-
ing on the data available.
The model is also designed in a way that it could potentially be used as a sub system of
a larger system. In our case the larger system would be a model of the entire economy.
There is a danger that conceptualizing systems in too small of a framework can result
in problems of sub-optimization. Sub-optimization refers to decisions that optimize the
behavior of a subsystem but are less than optimal for the system as a whole. For example,
an efficient allocation in roundwood model under its isolated demand scenarios can be
quite inappropriate given changes in demand patterns due to changes in the upstream
industry structure.
Another very important factor that lead to the use of a simulation tool rather than to
the use of an optimization tool is the fact that simulations do not force the analyst to
put values on functions of the system. This is especially important in situations where
explicit values do not exists or are hard to agree upon. In our approach we are more
confronted with multiple target values and certain regulations. The optimal strategy or
optimal state can only be approximated via more or less extensive sensitivity analysis of
individual users which by nature have different values and utility functions. By intelligent
and systematic investigation one should be able to learn under what conditions the sys-
tem performs most efficiently and effectively. This indirect use of optimization purposes
is shown by a simulation’s ability to answer ”what if” questions.
The simulation approach makes best use of the available information. By assimilating
the existing knowledge and hard data in the most efficient way one makes use of the
giant database and the GIS system that was built during the years of the IIASA Forest
Resources Project.
1.4.2 Review of existing models
In this section I will shortly review the currently existing paradigm to analyze large scale
forest industry models. Afterwards, I will try to justify the modeling approach taken and
simultaneously try to categorize the model within the currently existing approaches. This
will be done using the same structure as used by Nabuurs and Pa˝ivinen, 1996.
Let me start the critique of the existing paradigm with the words of Michael Prowse,
columnist for the Financial Times :”I need hardly underline the contrast between this
red-blooded characterization of capitalism and the insipid general-equilibrium model so
beloved by mainstream theorists”. It is exactly this general equilibrium model that is
applied in most attempts of the forest industrial economist to model future developments
in the sector. More ironical even is that the profession even dares to give policy recom-
mendations based on their questionable methodological base with no discussion about its
relevance or limitations for the objective of the study or analysis carried out. It is still a
miracle to me that such work can still be published in journal article or book form. More
recent experience, however, has shown that such work better enters the recycling process
rather than be read by a broader audience. It is no secret anymore that industry profes-
sionals for the most case put much pressure on “forest industry theorist’s” by measuring
their performance by the match between their results and reality.
During the last few years, there has been increasing criticism by high profile economists
about the general equilibrium. I will limit myself to mentioning only a few of the criti-
cisms. Stiglitz states, “General equilibrium theory is widely regarded as a splendid intel-
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lectual curiosity rather as a model of reality. The models are fundamentally wrong in that
they assume perfect information, perfect competition, and no technical change. Anybody
looking at theses models would say they can’t provide a good description of the modern
world.” Soros continues, “the theory is that free and competitive markets bring supply
and demand into equilibrium and therefore ensure the best allocation of resources. But
when we examine the assumptions for the theory closely, we find that they do not apply to
the real world. The condition that supply and demand are independently given cannot be
reconciled with reality. The assumption of perfect knowledge has proven unsustainable,
so it was replaced by an ingenious device. The world is dominated by imperfect under-
standing. In reality there is no theoretical equilibrium, the contention that free markets
lead to the optimum allocation of resources loses its justification. “ And lastly, William
Vickery states, “These models have little to do with improving welfare.”
Let me now closer examine the structure of the general equilibrium model. The gen-
eral equilibrium model assumes that when there were many economic agents each might
reasonably be assumed to take market prices as outside of their control. Given these ex-
ogenous prices, each agent could determine his or her demands and supplies for the good
in question. At the price adjusted to clear the market, as such the equilibrium price, no
agent would desire to change his or her actions.
In the case were we describe a single market story we speak of a partial equilibrium in
that all prices other than the price of the good being studied are assumed to remain fixed.
In the general equilibrium model all prices are variable and the equilibrium requires that
all markets clear. Thus, general equilibrium theory takes account of all of the interac-
tions between markets, as well as the functioning of the individual markets. One of the
main assumptions in a general equilibrium is that markets are competitive. Suppose now
that there are i = 1, . . . , n consumers and j = 1, . . . ,m firms. Each consumer i has a
quasi-linear utility function ui(xi) + yi and each firm j has a cost function cj(xj).
An allocation in this context will describe how much each consumer consumes of the x-
good and the y-good, (xi, yi), for i = 1, . . . , n and how much each firm produces of the
x-good, zj, for j = 1, . . . ,m. Since we know the cost function of each firm, the amount of
the y-good used by each firm j is simply cj(zj). The initial endowment of each consumer
is taken to be some given amount of the y-good, ωi, and 0 of the x-good.
A reasonable candidate for a welfare maximum in this case is an allocation that maximizes
the sum of utilities , subject the constraint that the amount produced be feasible. The
sum of utilities is
n∑
i=1
ui(xi) +
n∑
i=1
yi (1.1)
The total amount of the y-good is the sum of the initial endowments, minus the amount
used up in production:
n∑
i=1
yi =
n∑
i=1
ωi −
n∑
i=1
cj(zj). (1.2)
Substituting this into the objective function and recognizing the feasibility constraint that
the total amount of the x-good produced must equal the total amount consumed we have
the maximization problem
maxxi,zi
n∑
i=1
ui(xi) =
n∑
i=1
ωi −
n∑
i=1
cj(zj)
s.t.
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n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
j=1
zj. (1.3)
Letting λ be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the answer to this maximization
problem must satisfy
u′i(x
∗
i ) = λ
c′i(z
∗
j ) = λ (1.4)
along with the feasibility constraint.
But note that these are precisely the conditions that must be satisfied by an equilibrium
price p∗ = λ. Such an equilibrium price makes marginal utility equal to marginal cost and
simultaneously makes demand equal to supply. Hence, the market equilibrium necessarily
maximizes welfare, at least as measured by the sum of the utilities.
In the same spirit, PELPS III by Zhang et al. 1996, calculate a spatial equilibrium in
competitive markets by maximizing the sum of producer and consumer surplus subject to
material balance and capacity constraints for the forest industry. The optimization finds
the production, consumption and trade that maximizes the total value of consumption
minus the total cost of production for all products in all countries, in a given year. The
objective function for a particular year looks then as follows:
maxZ =
∑
i
∑
k
∫ Dik
0
Pik(Dik)dDik −
∑
i
∑
k
∫ Sik
0
Pik(Sik)dSik −
∑
i
∑
k
Yikmik (1.5)
where:
i, k = 1 country, commodity
P = price in US dollars
D = final product demand
S = raw material supply
Y = quantity manufactured
m = cost of manufacture
Without going into all the technical problems (see for more details Nilsson 1997) of this
approach let me give again a few comment to illustrate why such a general equilibrium
approach has be ruled out for any reasonable forest industry modeling efforts, not only
for the Russian case.
• Assumptions on perfect competition 5 and perfect information
• Identical agents (believes and strategies) and identical technology
• Frictionless markets and no externalities
• Economies of scale
• No policy distortions
There are many more assumptions and each would deserve an entire monograph to be
reviewed. Let me end here by simply saying that forest economists for the most part will
have to reconsider their profession similar to what macro-economists have to go through
5This assumption has been loosened by Ronnilla (1995) for the Finnish pulp and paper industry. The
Cournot solution, however, ends finally in a game of perfect competition.
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at the moment 6 It is high noon to think about new paradigms in the profession other-
wise the entire profession will soon be out-competed by other professions which are more
capable to meet the criteria of reality. It becomes increasingly insufficient for academics,
who work in the field of forestry and forest industry, to do nothing more than solving a
problem of a particular set of linear equations like in the case of the the general equilib-
rium model.
Let me, however, now return to the question why I choose to develop a new model from
scratch using some ideas from auction theory rather than adopting a ready made the-
oretical framework with easy to use prefabricated commercial computer programs - the
black-box doing the miracle for the researcher. To make it clear at this point that the
model developed was created on the bases of some ideas from auction theory, but does not
built on the theory of auction theory per se. The reason for this is that I simulate a mul-
tilateral auction where I allow for heterogeneity among buyers and sellers. This is what
we find in reality if we want to simulate exchange by auctions in our market setting 7.
Auction theory, is not advanced enough that one could analyze these type of auctions
with the help of a sound and clean theoretic basis. Thus, if one would ask the question of
what is new in my approach, I would have to answer “Everything is new! I invented a new
economic framework for industry analysis.”. It is also rather difficult to give an answer
to the question to which scientific field the model building approach belongs to. I would
answer this question by saying that it belongs to operations research and economics. A
categorization within the sectoral models on the other hand can more easily be made. In
terms of Nabuurs and Paeivinen (1996), my dissertation model belongs to the category of
large scale forest sector models. In order to make this point I want to stick to the same
methodological structure as presented in Nabuurs and Pa˝ivinen (1996) to put my model
into the framework of large scale forest sector models.
1.4.3 The PSFIM as a large scale forest sector model
Full name: Pan Siberian Forest Industry Model
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
The PSFIM was originally designed to model allocation pattern of production in the
Siberian forest sector during its transition from a command economy to an economy
based on market principles. Due to the implausibility of assumptions built in standard
economic models combined with the possibility to link to an extensive resource data base,
the modeling strategy was to build an easy-to-understand and easy-to-compute economic
model which makes sense and takes maximum use of existing data and expert knowl-
edge. The model is based on Vickery’s Nobel Prize Winning auction theory in order to
simulate the possible future formation of Russia’s forest industrial sector. In the model
I distinguish between a static phase and a dynamic one. The static phase describes the
auction mechanism, which is applied for each period, leading to a partial market clearing
depending on the producer and price constraints. In the dynamic phase, product prices
6Many macro-economists, famous names like Paul Romer, start nowadays a PhD course with the
words “forget everything you heard so far in your economics classes....”.
7The word auction can equally be substituted by the term negotiation where the auction setting is
used to simulate negotiation behavior reflecting the negotiation power of the agents taking part.
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adjust, producers invest or depreciate capital, contract partners revise contract policies
and, finally, prices change according to the overall economic development. The model can
be used as a decision making tool for policy analysis of various scenarios and levels of
detail and is capable to model the entire economic system on the basis of the behavior of
individual firms.
METHODOLOGY
Modules of the model
The core of the PSFIM consists of two parts: the static or allocation phase,and the
dynamic phase where investment, demand, price and uncertainty levels are determined.
There are two additional modules which calculate costs for individual firms and demand
for various regions. The model is hirachical in the sense that submodules for the different
branches (products) of final consumption are calculated first and the different raw-material
suppliers deliver to the wood working mills in a second stage8. Due to the simple structure
it is possible to simulate individual enterprises that either do trading within the region
or do export to other regions. Aggregations can simply be calculated by taking the sum
over individual producers.
Input data
Enormous amounts of data 9 from different sources and expert knowledge has been in-
volved in the development of the model. The model is designed that upon the arrival of
new knowledge or hard data these information can rapidly be included. In the current
version a cost module calculates costs as a function of a number of variables starting from
forest inventory information, forest management rules, to harvesting and processing tech-
nology. Market information has been taken from Russian and International sources. For
example for the analysis of major international markets, FAO data were used 10. Depend-
ing on the study’s objective, scenarios will require time series data for the estimation of
demand functions. However, different demand scenarios can also be explored if there are
no data available by simple guesses or other types of analysis. In addition, the user can
specify different types of economic agents. In respect to their behavior agents can differ
in regards to their market power and negotiation skills, and in regard to their ability to
stick to the terms of the contract negotiated. For a review of all variables and parameters
of the model (see section 4.1).
Level of calculation
Calculations are carried out at an individual mill and product level for the respective
geographic area analyzed. The geographic area can vary form a small economic region up
to the global scale. Likewise, the product definition can be refined to any level depending
on the input data quality and the respective questions asked. In this thesis only results
for the lumber industry are shown.
8In the simulation presented in this thesis illustrating the lumber industry, sawmills are modeled as
autarc production units, which means that roundwood is produced by the lumber producer himself i.e.
the lumber producer does not need to purchase any roundwood from other producers.
9To make this point let me refer to the example that the transportation matrix of the roundwood cost
module has a size of 8 MB.
10The WWW-page reference is as follows: http : //apps.fao.org/lim500/Agri− db.pl.
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Simulation method 11
There are no industry wide (regional wide) cost functions. Costs are calculated for indi-
vidual producers delivering to all possible markets∗∗. Multiple technologies are possible
or simply a vector of production costs of individual producers∗.
Exchange is simulated not by a very specific class of trade game (i.e. maximization of
consumer and producer rent or any other one-sided optimization) but negotiations or auc-
tions are simulated using multiple decision criteria with different negotiation capabilities
and market power of individual agents ∗∗. Optimization of any kind can be treated and
implemented as special cases. In addition to heterogeneity in the cost structure, agents
are heterogenous in terms of strategies and reliability∗∗.
Prices and investments adapt as a function of inter alia current and past profits, installed
capacities and expected demand ∗.
Input and output data are linked to a GIS.
Control variables in decision making
See section 4.1.
Method for finding the final solution
Depending on the market or negotiation power of the buyers or sellers the algorithm ei-
ther allows the buyers purchase at a low price or the sellers sell at a high price. Either
the producers or the buyers gain relatively more from the transaction. An increasing
price auction with a reserve price is iteratively conducted until either producer or buyer
constraints are violated. Due to the nature of the auction set up it is impossible (also
theoretically) for the individual agents to compute their optimal strategy in the auction
nor is it possible to compute the optimal strategy 12 over periods using an inter-temporal
optimization procedure. Nonetheless, the agents behavior tends towards a quasi-optimal
state in a distant future period.
RESULTS
Timescale and period length
The model was developed to simulate over an unlimited horizon of projection years. It
seems, however, more sensible to limit the simulation to a restricted period of time since
we tend to accumulate errors over time with undesirably large prediction errors. Cur-
rently the model runs for projections over 10 years in one year time steps.
Output unit
Typically, output is given at an individual enterprise level of the final product. Trade
flows between individual agents, prices negotiated by individual bargain, supply slacks,
capital formation, profits, investment and many other details can be reported on an indi-
vidual mill level or be aggregated to regions or macro-regions.
11Ideas and solution concepts that are basically new compared to other methods used by the profession
are marked by ∗ to ∗∗ depending on the degree of “newness”
12Please, note that for example short-term profit maximizing behavior of any agent is clearly not
compatible with long-term profit maximization. This is true for the model and, as it seems to me, also
true in reality.
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EXAMPLES AND FUTURE PLANS
The model was until recently under construction and some calibration runs have been
carried out to model the forest sector of Siberia. Future plans are to model the global
pulp and paper industry, the Russian forest sector and probably analyze some Scandi-
navian regions. After publishing this dissertation parts of the model will be published
in economic and operations research journals. In addition experiments will have to be
carried out in order to pin down negotiation behavior across different cultures.
MODEL TECHNICALITIES
Flexibility for dealing with varying levels of decision making and varying geographic scales
The model is based on the behavior and characteristics of individual enterprises. Thus
aggregations can be made at any time. At the same time individual units can also be
replaced by an aggregate. It will, however, be indispensable to use information on the
industrial structure of the aggregates analyzed 13.
Method for linking to the biological subsystem
The model was designed in such a way that it would use the Korovin (1996) model as a
sub-module which would predict annual allowable harvest levels and inventory data for
individual forest management units. Unfortunately, the Korovin model, in its current
version is not capable to ’collaborate’ with my model. This is due to some technical in-
capabilities, unnecessary rigidities and computational constraints of the Korovin model.
It is planned to adapt the Korovin model such that it becomes more open and can be
integrated into a larger model.
In principle, however, the model can easily integrate any biological model. There is of
course a strong preference to integrate a model with a biological sub-module which would
model forest ecosystems of the size that would realistically match the level of detail of
operations of an individual enterprise.
Method for dealing with international trade
The model analyzes inter alia international trade flows. Here factors like transportation
costs, loading and reloading costs, tariffs and quotas are included in the analysis. In
addition, the model is capable to model differences in the business approaches of different
cultures.
Method for dealing with transportation and processing costs
As mentioned before, the transportation system can most realistically be computed. The
transportation system, enters the model as an exogenous infrastructure to be used. A
GIS system computes the cheapest transportation variant for each individual producer
delivering potentially to all markets. The best solution enters the model as the ’used’
transportation solution for the individual producer. As means of transportation from the
mill, lorries, ships and railways can be used. Transportation to the mill is exclusively
modeled by truck transport. Currently there is hardly any timber floated in Russia.
Timber harvesting costs are calculated for individual operations depending on the phys-
ical and economic parameters governing harvest operations of the individual enterprise.
13This is in principle also true for the currently existing model approaches, however, is largely ignored
by the researchers.
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Wood processing costs are also calculated on an individual mill level. Processing costs
will largely depend on the quality and cost structure of inputs (dimension, species, and
cost of roundwood and factor costs) and the capability to exploit economies of scale of
the individual enterprises.
Ability for dealing with wood processing capacity and allocation
Processing capacity can be simulated in great detail in the PSFIM. First of all, the model
allows for different kinds of technology. There is a possibility to introduce technology
choice as a function of the requirements demanded at target market. Let me make this
point by referring to the example of a Siberian lumber mill delivering to the European
market. The mill will have to use more eco-save and high quality production technology in
this case opposed to technology for the production of deliveries to Central Asia. Capacity
additions are calculated in such a way that the entire industry composed of individual
producers has the tendency to converge to a quasi-optimal solution∗∗. Investments and
inherited capacities age through time and if production is allocated in a less competitive
environment it may finally close down. Aggregate investment levels have to be supplied
exogenously but can also be endogenized. Aggregated investments are then partitioned
among perspective producers each period. Partitioning is calculated proportional to the
specific investment attractiveness of individual producers.
Ability to take into account environmental effects of wood processing
Environmental effects as such would have to be added by a special module creating a
function where pollutant or other adverse environmental effects are modeled in depen-
dence of production output and the technology used 14. Indirectly, environmental action
plans can be included in the cost functions of different technologies. Many environmental
problems in the forest sector are of local nature. PSFIM was designed in such a way that
such local environmental effects can be included in the analysis.
User friendliness
The current version of the model is programmed in GAUSS 3.0 (1996). There is no user
friendly interface implemented.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
GAUSS 3.0 can either be installed on a PC or on an UNIX machine. It is highly recom-
mended to implement the model on an UNIX system if the seller/buyer matrix exceeds a
dimension of 100 × 100.
1.4.4 Auction theory
The latest Nobel prize in economics was awarded to the honorable economist William
Vickery for his findings in auction theory. During the privatization process little atten-
tion has so far been given to auction theory in transition economics in almost all transition
countries . In this dissertation I use ideas and theories of auctions in order to simulate
possible future pattern formation of the forest industrial sector in Siberia. I will not tackle
the problem of privatization of former state enterprises with auction theoretic approaches,
14Currently such functions are developed by the Author for the Austrian Pulp and Paper industry.
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however, more so use these tools to approximate an efficient geographic distribution of the
industrial production. In this dissertation I will mainly discuss the analytical structure
and concentrate less on numerical results.
Auctions are one of the oldest forms to determine transaction prices. One of the earliest
reports on an auction is attributed to the Greek historian Herodotus. He described the
sale of women to men willing to get married in Babylonia around the fifth century B.C..
Historical sources tell us about various auctions taking place in Greece, the Roman Em-
pire, China, and Japan. Not only history is witness of this economic institution, but also
nowadays auctions are used in a remarkable range of situations. There are auctions for
livestock, flowers, antiques, artwork, stamps, wine, real estate, publishing rights, timber
rights, used cars, contracts and land, and for equipment and supplies of bankrupt firms
and farms, etc.. Auctions are of special interest to economists because they are explicit
mechanisms, which describe how prices are formed.
The continuing popularity of auctions makes one wonder about the reasons for this. One
explanation is that auctions often yield outcomes that are efficient and stable. Or to say
it more formally, in a static deterministic model, the set of perfect equilibrium trading
outcomes obtained in an auction game (as the minimum bid is varied) coincides with the
set of core allocations.
A second explanation might be that a seller in a relatively weak bargaining position,
consider the case where the seller is the owner of a nearly bankrupt firm, can do as well
as a strong bargainer by conducting an auction. However, the seller then can not use
strategic policies like imposing a reserve price or charging entry fees. Even a seller in a
strong bargaining position may decide to sell via auction, if it is optimal in relation to
other exchange possibilities. These three partly complementary explanations provide a
cogent set of reasons for a seller to use an auction when selling an indivisible object.
The four most common auction forms are the first and second price sealed-bid, the English,
and the Dutch auction 15. Depending on what kind of good is to be sold we talk about
private or common values auctions. The private value assumption is mostly satisfied for
nondurable goods. This is due to the fact that we can say that the consumption of such
a good is a personal matter. In contrast, if we consider durable goods the private value
assumption is not fulfilled anylonger. There is the possibility of resale and therefore there
is a market price.
Usually the seller and the bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral. Nevertheless there
are papers dealing with risk-averse bidders. The same is true for symmetry. Symmetry
or asymmetry among bidders means that we have to take into consideration whether the
buyers draw their signals from a symmetric or an asymmetric probability distribution. The
former implies that all bidders are homogeneous, whereas the latter allows heterogeneity
among them.
1.4.5 Description of various auction forms
First and Second-Price Sealed Bid Auction The first-price auction is a sealed bid
auction in which the buyer with the highest bid obtains the object and pays the amount
15For a closer description on auctions the reader is referred to the following readings of Boeheim and
Zulehner 1997, Bulow and Klemperer 1994, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 1971, Cassady 1967, Davis and
Holt 1993, Fudenberg and Tirol, Hendricks and Paarsch 1993, Kagel 1995, McAfee and McMillan 1987,
Milgram 1987, Myerson 1981, Paarsch 1991, Wilson 1992 [55].
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bid. Whereas in the second-price auction the item still goes to the bidder with the highest
bid, but the bidder pays only the amount of the second highest bid. This arrangement
does not necessarily mean a loss of revenue for the seller, as in this auction form the
buyers will generally bid higher than in the first-price auction. The second-price auction
is also known as the ”Vickrey” auction.
Dutch Auction The Dutch auction, also called descending auction, is conducted by
an auctioneer who initially calls for a very high price and then continuously lowers the
price until some bidder stops the auction and claims the good for that price. This kind
of auction is frequently used in the agricultural sector.
English Auction There is more than one variant of the English auction. In some
the bidders themselves are calling the bids and when nobody is willing to raise the bid
anymore the auction ends. Another possibility is that the auctioneer calls the bids and the
bidders indicate their assents by a slight gesture. Yet there is another form of the English
auction, where the price is posted using an electronic display and is raised continuously.
A bidder who is active at the current price presses a button. In the moment the bidder
releases the button she has withdrawn from the auction. This variant is in particular used
in Japan. These are three quite different forms of the English auction with three quite
different corresponding games.
Tender auction Under a tender auction, as referred in the following text we understand
an auction where the auctioneer calls a price and sellers announce their quantities they
are willing to deliver at that price. It is possible to have a fixed or increasing price tender
auction. A combination of the two is also possible where the price increases at first and
level off at the end. By this the auctioneer risks to fail the target quantity originally set
out for the tender. The auctioneer will of course stop auctioning if the target value is
reached.
1.5 Intuitive description of the PSFIM
Siberia is a large piece of land where producers are sparsely scattered. Many times
producers are far away from markets of their products. In addition, the entire economic
environment has considerably changed after the collapse of the command economy. The
problem centers now around the question of how the allocation of production will change
during the transition to market economy. Today, economic agents in Siberia act according
to different economic paradigms as they were used to under the previous regime. Different
decision rules guide economic activities given a framework of changed constraints. Finally,
Russia has opened its borders which allows more freedom of capital and trade flows. It is
the purpose of the modeling effort presented in this paper to describe the effects of these
changes in the Siberian Forest sector.
The first economic activity of business partners in the Forest Industry of Siberia is to
establish trade contracts. Imagine now for simplicity a fictitious market hall at a trading
point in Russia 16. A trading point in this sense is located either at one of the Siberian
borders for export trade or located at the border to a wood working mill or by some
16This image can equally be treated as a traveling sales or purchase agent of the respective organization.
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final consumer of finished products. All producers, who due to their competitive position
and their available capacities, and who are potentially willing to sell their products are
invited to this market hall. In the market hall buyers and sellers meet. Buyers learn
about prices and quality of the products producers try to sell. As a side effect of this
discussion both buyers and sellers get a grasp of the reliability of their respective possible
contract partners 17. In addition, buyers get to know the geographic location of producers
and their productive capacities. By this buyers can make inference on the total cost of
delivery for each producer. Generally buyers believe, to some degree, that:
• Reliability and quality of services increase with the profit margin for each producer.
• Buying from a high profit producer today will guarantee cheaper contracts in the
future when competition might become stiffer and prices adjust.
• Buyers have the tendency to contract with large (small) firms.
• At a generally low price level producers are more likely to be uncertain contract
partner whereas the reliability of buyers increases.
• Only producers who can profitably deliver their products can be reliable contact
partners.
Consequently, producers with a relatively high potential profit share and comparative
marketing advantages will get larger contracts at a given price.
The second argument following the listing is that if a buyer ’helps’ a producer with a
relatively high potential profit margin (i.e. low cost producer) to stay in business, this
particular enterprise might increase its capacity and will be more likely to be able to
decrease product prices in the periods to come if prices generally fall due to changes in
market conditions and the bargaining power of buyers increases. This latter point clearly
describes a strategic behavior of buyers to decrease expected future costs.
After all of this information is exchanged buyers decide where to buy and give out their
orders at the base price. Due to the fact that not all producers are willing to sell off their
goods at the base price it is likely that only a portion of the total demanded volume is
actually contracted out. Depending on the bargaining power of buyers against sellers,
quantities that are given out for tendering in each auction are set exogenously. This
is considered to be common knowledge and is taken into account by the buyers when
making their offers. After buyers revealed their preferences to the individual producers,
depending on their own bargaining power and the producer structure, producers decide
to accept, modify or reject proposed offers. Producers, of course, will screen all proposals
and will select among them. Most profitable proposals are accepted immediately whereas
others will be postponed with the hope to come back to a similar offer when tender prices
increased. Some relatively unprofitable proposals will never be accepted.
In the Russian business environment, ordered products might get lost or to some extend
17In the model setup it could be agreed that certain consumers would buy timber products from
sustainable managed forests whereas others would not change their preferences in dependence of the
forest management regime. Thus, certain producers would be required to manage their forests according
to certain forest management rules. Sound forest management rules will ultimately result in higher
roundwood production costs. In the current version of the model sustainable management of the forest
resources is modeled by decreasing productivity from the base productivity, which assumes clear cutting.
Productivity is decreased by varying the number of trees removed per hectar. Additionally, world class
harvesting equipment is assumed to be used that would guarantee the least ecological impact.
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be of bad quality so that not the entire contract volume as originally negotiated is realized.
Strategically, producers have the tendency to deliver bad quality if prices are low. Buyers
on the other had will postpone payment or complain about delivered quality of the product
with increasing prices.
It follows that after the first round of negotiation buyers and sellers have to meet again.
Some weeks later the same auction procedure starts over again, however, with increased
product prices and different tender volumes. If there are still volumes to be tendered
in subsequent auctions product prices rise continuously until either producers run out
of capacity or buyers have satisfied their total demand. Any price increase leads to an
increasing number of competitors entering the market.
At the end, when no more auctions are conducted, all agents involved analyze past market
processes, update their information and develop new strategies for investments, price and
contract policies for the next period to come. Policy setting of each individual agent
involves analysis of the past as well as expected future market developments including
prices, competition, total demand, overall investment climate and uncertainty. Strategies,
if feasible in the light of the financial and natural resource conditions, are implemented by
each producer. Trading according to the tender mechanism starts again in the following
period.
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Chapter 2
Mathematical formulation
In the model description I distinguish between a static phase and a dynamic phase. The
static phase describes the auction mechanism, which is applied each period, leading to
partial market clearing depending on producer and price constraints. In the dynamic
phase product prices adjust, producers invest or depreciate capital, contract partners
revise contract policies and finally input prices change according to the overall economic
development.
2.1 The static phase
In this section I will develop the core of the simulation model, i.e. the auction mechanism.
In the auction procedure, buyers start to give out orders to the individual enterprises.
The behavior of buyers is described by an allocation rule and an array of constraints.
Sellers after receiving offers from different buyers screen all offers and decide which offers
they will take, modify or reject.
2.1.1 The buyers’ problem
The equation system 2.1 describes the behavioral rule with which buyers determine pur-
chasing proposals to the individual producers 1.
The analytical formula looks as follows 2,
1Please note that the index for the product or product group l was dropped for the reason of con-
venience, however, appears later at some points were we have to differentiate between different product
groups.
2The following indexes are used:
e = 1, . . . , E Number of eco-regions where enterprises are located
i = 1, . . . , N Total number of enterprises at products market l.
(Note that the index sets of i, j, k are again vectors of
the dimension 1xL for l = 1, . . . , L indexing the number
of markets in product space.)
j = 1, . . . ,M Number of markets in geographic space
k = 1, . . . , K Number of tender auctions in period t
t = 1, . . . , T s Number of simulated periods
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Yijtk =
(
SijktΩijt∑
j(SijktΩijt)
USijtkQ
)
(DjtAjtkU
B
ijtkQ
)
where
Yijtk > 0 if


Yijtk ≥ Y minij∑
k
∑
j Yijtk ≤ Y¯it∑
k
∑
i Yijtk ≤ Djt
Cijt ≤ P¯jtkUBijtkP∑
k
∑
i
∑
j Yijetk ≤ R¯et
Yijtk = 0 if else. (2.1)
Yijtk . . .Output of producer i which is delivered to market j
at time t in kth tender
Sijkt . . . Service coefficient of producer i at market j
in kth tender at time t (see equation 2.2)
Ωijt . . .Coefficient of comparative non-technological scale effects
of producer i at market j at time t (see equation 2.5)
USijtkQ . . . Contract uncertainty of seller. Random number drawn from
a uniform distribution for market j with E(USijtkQ) = ξ
QS
jt
and V AR(USijtkQ) = σξQSjt
at time t. (see section 2.2.4)
Djt . . .Total tender volume at market j at time t
Ajtk . . .Parameter determining the size of tender volumes for the kth auction
at market j at time t. Ajtkǫ]0, 1]
UBijtkQ . . . Contract uncertainty of buyer. Random number drawn from
a uniform distribution for market j with E(UBijtkQ) = θ
QB
jt and
V AR(UBijtkQ) = σθQBjt
at time t (see equation 2.3 and section 2.2.4).
Y¯it . . . Production capacity of producer i at time t.
Y minij . . .Minimum contract size. Y
min
ij ǫℜ+
Cijt . . .Unit production cost (CIF) of producer i at time t to market j
P¯jtk . . .Vector of maximum total cost at market j where
transaction is allowed at time t in kth iteration
Ret . . .Biological resource constraint (AAC 3) in ecoregion e at time t
The allocation rule,4 the first line in equation 2.1, consists of four main driving forces.
They are the ability to provide additional services, demand, market position and contract
uncertainty.
Let me start with the ability to provide additional services. Services can only be provided
by producers which can actually afford to do so. In this respect the ability to provide
additional services is a direct function of the profit per unit output of the respective seller
who would sign a contract to deliver to a certain market as described in equation 2.2.
Sijkt = π
ηjt
ijkt
= (P¯jtkU
B
ijtkP
− CPitUCit −CTijt)ηjt (2.2)
4The allocation rule in its current formulation is provisional. First the elements are obviously highly
collinear and should be premultiplied by the variance-covariance matrix in order to yield an eucledian
space. The weights will have to be adjusted accordingly. We are currently testing various risk metric
approaches. Contracts should then be tendered according to risk/benefit ratings of individual companies.
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πijkt . . .Profit per unit output for producer i delivering to market j
at time t in the kth auction.
UBijtkP . . . Price uncertainty of buyer. Random number drawn from a
uniform distribution for market j
with E(UBijtkP ) = θ
P
jt and V AR(U
B
ijtkP
) = σθP
jt
at time t.
CPit . . .Production cost per unit output of producer i at time t
UCit . . .Random variable drawn form a truncated normal distribution
with E(UCit ) = γt ≤ 1 and V AR(UCit ) = σCt at time t
CTijt . . .Transportation cost per unit for producer i to market j at time t
ηjt . . .Degree of profit maximization at market j at time t with ηjtǫℜ+
Including profits per unit of output, πijkt, in the service equation help to describe a type
of ’cost minimizing’ behavior of buyers. Although in the model buyers are purchasing
the product at the current tender price,P¯jtk, costs are minimized in the sense that (1)
additional services are provided free of charge, (2) a least cost seller is more reliable in
keeping the terms of the contract, and (3) that expected future price for a product of
a low cost producer might adjust to the competitive price (i. e. Et(P¯jTk∗ = C)) if the
business environment becomes more price competitive. The probability, if we were to
see the problem in a probabilistic context 5, that an enterprise will deliver its products
to a particular market increases exponentially, ηjt, with the profit per unit output of
the individual enterprises to be earned on this market. The production costs per se are
allowed to vary additionally to the variation according to the calculations described in
section 3.1. This additional variation follows the law of a normal truncated distribution,
UCit = N
tr(γt, σCt ) and should reflect differences among producers in production costs due
to inter alia unobserved variables such as management skills and efficiency of the work
force employed. In addition, buyers can only marginally deviate from the ’official’ tender
price and make special offers to individual producers. This is achieved by adding some
random noise, UBijtkP , to the current tender price P¯jtk.
The second variable to be discussed concerning the allocation rule is demand. In the
model, demand is a 1 × K vector, with K being the number of markets. This vector
sets the upper limit of volumes to be traded at a particular trading point. Thus demand
can be interpreted as the maximum export volume at a particular export trading point
or maximum domestic consumption at one of the domestic trading points. The elements
of the vector are either estimated with the help of econometric models as discussed in
section 3.2 or are simply estimated by per capita consumption growth and population
growth assumptions. The probability that a producer delivers to a certain market is
linear to the size of the market 6. In the first tender, k = 1, a portion, Djt1Aj1, of demand
is given out to be tendered. In the second tender, k = 2, another portion of the remaining
5In principle there are several other options available to obtain an equilibrium at the kth auction. One
could either take a general equilibrium approach were producer and consumer surplus are maximized or
one could either maximize for the buyer or the seller as shortly discussed in the following paragraph on
optimal behavior. The beauty of the probabilistic approach is, however, that multiple criteria can be
optimized.
6If we loosen up the linearity assumption, this would mean that a collection of producers or even
all producers like particular markets better than others. This market behavior can be implemented by
either increasing the demand of the preferred market in the allocation rule while keeping the demand
in the constraint set to the original value. This would mean that producers actually over- respectively
underestimate the true size of the market. The other way to introduce differences in the preferences of a
subset of producers would be to introduce a preference matrix adjusting for the differences. A deviation
from the linearity assumption could be motivated by the existence of stake effects - a well known result
in empirical economics.
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demand, Djt2Aj2 for Djt2 = Djt1 −∑i Yijt1 , is given out. In the following periods tender
volumes at particular markets are calculated likewise. Remaining demand in period t is
calculated by Djtk = Djtk−1 −∑i∑k−11 Yijtk.
Further, the model allows to mimic market power. If Aj1 is close to unity, low cost
producers are ’forced’ by the model to sell off their products earlier in the auction. By this
a powerful buyer is able to purchase a product at a relatively low price. The effect of Ajk
can, however, also be interpreted from the sellers point of view. IfAj1 is relatively high, low
cost producers are willed to sell their products earlier in the auction. They might fear to
have too many additional bidders in the next rounds, k+1, k+2, . . ., which would decrease
their market share and might also lower the overall profit of the individual producer. Being
in the position of owning a large market share has some utility. If the utility of having a
high market share is larger than the utility of producing at maximum profits at time t,
Aj1 becomes also a measure of an inter temporal rate of substitution with the implication
that a rational acting agent would set off lower profits today with expected higher profits
in the future, due to the producer’s market position, if the accumulated discounted profit
stream is maximized given the producer’s information set at time t. Following this line
of arguments we find that high market power (i.e. Aj1 → 1) on the buyers side can
equivalently be treated as a fierce competitive environment among producers. Due to
heterogeneity among producers a more competitive environment i.e. high bargaining
power on the buyers side, will eventually lead to a concentrated producer structure by the
model. A weak market position of buyers would contrarily allow producers with relatively
higher costs stay longer in a particular market. As a result, weak market power will lead
to higher variance in prices and a less concentrated, but inefficient, producer structure.
Ajk has to be set exogenously and has to be determined according to the ability of a
particular buyer to purchase products on the international market.
In each tender the calculated potential contract volume is multiplied by two random
numbers (USijtkQ, U
B
ijtkQ
) drawn from two uniform distributions. The parameters θjt and
ξjt determine the lower (Low) and upper (Up) bound of the uniform distribution. The
description of how the parameters adjust has to be postponed at this stage and is described
in detail in section 2.2.3. This is due to the fact that the change in contract uncertainty
is dependent on the current market price, which we did not discuss yet. The strategies
concerning contract reliability are different for buyers and sellers. Buyers will be more
interested in acting according to the contract if the price level is relatively low. Sellers on
the other hand will try to be more reliable if prices are high. In the current version of the
model contract reliability from the sellers side only affects the size of the contracts. This
is to say that the volumes, that would have been traded based on the assumptions we
made on all other variables in the allocation rule, are multiplied by a number drawn from
the uniform distribution determined by ξjt. This essentially reflects the sellers doubts that
the potential buyer is able to pay the price agreed upon or the unwillingness to accept
other items in the contract. Contract uncertainty from the buyers’ side can influence both
the size of the contract proper by changing θCjt, or change the price which the buyer might
suggest to the individual seller by changing θPjt. Thus the contract uncertainty from the
buyer’s side also influences the profitability of producers. The interpretation is such that
if a buyer judges that a certain producer is reliable the buyer will give him/her a higher
price and a larger contract volume. Thus the buyer charges a risk premium or gives it
to the seller depending on the judgment. In this case the influence on price and size
go together with the buyers judgment of the sellers reliability. The dependence between
22
these two types of contract uncertainty is expressed in equation 2.3
θPjt = ϑθ
C
jt for ϑǫℜ+. (2.3)
The market success of each individual producer is now dependent on the marketing strat-
egy and the reliability of both partners involved in the trading procedure. By introducing
uncertainty this modeling approach allows, for example, that a producer despite the fact
of an inefficient and expensive production scheme is successfully marketing its products.
This is in fact what we see in many markets not only in Russia.
Economic elements which are not directly related to technology like market dominance
or formal or informal producer networks also play an important role in the dynam-
ics of the Russian Forest Industry of today. These effects are subsumed in the term
’non-technological scale effects’(Ωijt). There are mainly three reasons to speak of ’non-
technological’ scale effects:
1. Scale effects in marketing and trading activities 7
2. Market power of producers increases with size.
3. Large enterprises tend to produce higher quality.
Ωijt within the model is formulated as follows,
Ωijt = (1 +
Y¯
αjx
itx∑
j Y¯
αjx
it
ωjt) (2.5)
Y¯itx . . . Production capacity of producer i at time t of technology x.
αjx . . .Degree of non-technological scale effects for technology x. αjxǫℜ
ωjt . . .Coefficient non-technological scale effects
at market j at time t. ωjtǫℜ+
The degree of scale effects within the set of eligible producers delivering to a certain
market is modeled by changing the parameter α. The scale effect Scalei is,
Scalei =


decreasing if α < 0
constant if α = 0
increasing if α > 0.
The overall effect of ’non-technological scale effects’ on product allocation, i.e. relative
change of volumes allocated due to the ’non-technological scale effects’ is determined by
the coefficient ωjt. One could call ωjt the elasticity of ’non-technological scale effects’ in
this sense.
The initial endowment of productive capacities is given and defined by the production
7In the current version of the model the existence of Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) is ignored.
Currently there is not sufficient information available on membership of individual enterprises belonging
to a FIG. If this information would be available we would include this information as follows:
ωjt = ωi∗jt = ωjtI
FIG (2.4)
IFIG is an informationmatrix creating the sum to the respective FIG. In our case IFIG = ei∗ej suggesting
that there are no FIG existing.
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output in 1989. In subsequent periods when producers are allowed to expand capacities,
production capacity Y¯itx is made up of two parts as discussed in section 2.2. I differ-
entiate between capacities from old technology (Y¯ Oitx) which is essentially the capacities
inherited from the past and newly added capacity (Y¯ Nitx) via investment
8. As we are to
model non-technological scale effects as discussed above we put a stronger weight on new
technology i.e. in terms of market success of products produced by new technology, on
a relative basis, are more competitive than products produced by old technology. Thus
we can write the composite of old and new technology as Y¯itx = νjtY¯
N
itx + (1− νjt)Y¯ Oitx for
νjtǫ]0.5, 1].
The allocation rule is subject to a number of constraints. These constraints are the
size constraint of contracts, capacity constraint, demand constraint, constraint on the
profit level and a natural resource constraint for logging operations.
Contracts calculated by the allocation rule have to be over a minimum size Y minij . In the
model the minimum size will be treated as a multiple of a rail container volume.
The second line in the constraint set of equation 2.1 describes the capacity constraint.
This is that the sum of accumulated production dedicated to all markets of an individual
enterprise is not allowed to exceed its capacity. The capacity of each individual enterprise
was, for simplicity, set equal to the production output in 1989 as already mentioned. This
might, in fact, be a rather weak assumption, however, reflects the current state of infor-
mation. Additionally, it is widely accepted among local and international experts (pers.
comm. Nilsson, Backman, Blam 1997) that this is the best currently available indicator
for capacity levels of individual enterprises. In this respect an information update on
the physical capacities should be performed to make better predictions. A time series on
capacity evolution would also be of great importance to improve the quality of the model
calibration exercise 9. In cases where
∑
k
∑
j Yijtk ≥ Y¯it with
∑
k
∑
j Yijtk−1 ≤ Y¯it contract
volume was set to Yijtk =
∑
k Yijtk−1+(Y¯it−
∑
k
∑
j Yijtk−1)Ind. Ind is an indicator matrix
for the direction of trade.
The third line in the constraint set describes the demand constraint. This is basically
saying that the sum of accumulated realized production of all enterprises dedicated to a
certain market can not exceed demand at this particular market.
The fourth line opens up the possibility to simulate supply side market imperfections via
price settings. In essence this constraint forces all producers to be under a certain price
benchmark in each iteration, k, in order to be able to compete at a certain market. From
a supplier point of view this constraint tries to mimic the profit level where producers are
still willing to market her/his product on a given market. If the total costs exceeds the
price level, P¯jtk, it is too unprofitable to deliver to the respective markets. In the current
8Note that in terms of technology and finally costs per unit output the two technologies are identical.
This is due to the fact that currently it is virtually impossible to obtain sensible productivity and cost
functions for Russian technology. We know, however, that Russians are somewhat indifferent in their
technological choices suggesting that cost functions are similar. This assumption might, however, be
rather strong and needs to be scrutinized for further modeling efforts. From a model building point of
view it would not be difficult to model sets of different technologies producing the same good. In addition,
the question arises which assumption should be made on technological choice for future production. In
the case of logging operations, however, it will be necessary to introduce different technologies for different
ecological and terrain conditions. Existing engineering models could be used for this particular task in
combination with preference functions of Russian entrepreneurs.
9In the case of round wood production this is especially important in the light of the ever increasing use
of the Wachter system in logging operations. The Russian expression Wachter system can be understood
as temporary logging champs. In addition the lifespan of logging equipment is rather short in Russia.
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setting it would also be possible for producers to enter the market with dumping prices.
This, however, was not included in our simulation runs. Prices are initially set according
to the available statistics.
The fifth line in the constraint set constrains the total output of all producers to be less
or equal to the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC). Let us call this constraint for now the
sustainability condition.
2.1.2 The sellers’ problem
After buyers revealed their offers to their potential set of sellers each individual seller
decides which offer he/she will accept, modify or reject. The seller will accept the offer if
it comes from the buyer which guarantees the highest returns, will modify, i.e. decrease
the contract size, if it comes from a buyer which would result in lower marginal profits
and will reject if the offer would yield marginal profits that would not justify delivery. In
the latter case the seller believes that she/he would be able to sell again with higher yield
in a tender to come 10 11.
Yijkt =


Yijkt if π
′
ijkt = π
′
∗
ijkt
Yijkt(
pi
′
ijkt
pi
′
∗
ijkt
)rl if π
′
ijkt ≤ π′∗ijkt and Yijtk(
pi
′
ijkt
pi
′
∗
ijkt
)rl ≥ Y minij
0 if π
′
ijkt < π
′
∗
ijkt and Yijtk(
pi
′
ijkt
pi
′
∗
ijkt
)rl ≤ Y minij
2.1.3 Optimal behavior
From a theoretical point of view the numerical calculation would converge to an opti-
mal solution of the allocation pattern of production for the buyer if the buying / selling
uncertainties, (σξQS
jt
, σ(.)θ , σ
C
t )→ 0, would converge to zero, the coefficient of profit maxi-
mization, η →∞, approach infinity and, all of the volume would be given out for tendering
in the first tender (i.e. A = 1 equal unity), the price increase be infinitely small but still
be positive (i.e. ∆P¯jtk ≤ ε), and the number of auctions within a period, K → ∞ be
allowed to be allowed to be infinitely large such that all potential capacity could be used.
For the calculation of the quasi-optimal state as illustrated in equation 2.14 I have set the
coefficients and parameters according to this reasoning.
Producers are allowed to optimize only within an individual tender. They are not able to
optimize within the framework of all tenders within a period and are further not able to
optimize in time across periods.
Given the present uncertain economic environment and given the rather poor enterprise
information the parameter values of the model will not be in a close neighborhood of the
optimal values, however, will converge slowly towards an optimum. This type of model
was constructed to allow agents to act according to an optimizing behavior, but only
to a certain extend. The optimizing behavior per se is not scrutinized, but the degree
10Here we make the assumption that sellers are not able to compute their optimal strategy to maximize
profits for the entire auction procedure. Sellers are not able to foresee quantities that will be offered to
them in the next round(s) and periods.
11The prime in pi
′
ijkt indicates that the seller selects offers from feasible contract partners only. Feasi-
bility is defined by the constraint set 2.1. pi
′
∗
ijkt indicates the maximum marginal profit out of the feasible
set of contracts.
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of optimization or optimizing behavior of the agents. This is probably the most distin-
guishing feature of the used approach in relation to standard models used in economics
and operations research. Thus, this is the beauty but also the weakness of the modeling
approach taken. The quality and the usefulness of the results hinge on the calibration of
the model. We are truly opening Panthoras box allowing for a lot of arbitrary inputs.
The trick is to open Panthoras box in a controlled manner.
2.2 The dynamic phase
In the dynamic phase we calculate changes in capacity following different investment
regimes, prices are allowed to adapt according to expected demand and supply scenarios,
maximum potential demand is forecasted and costs change according to input price and
technology scenarios. Not all of the variables mentioned are fully endogenized. There are
two main reasons for this. First, by endogenizing one buys also a lot of assumptions that
have to be made. Second, by endogenizing one looses to some extend control over what
the variable does in the model and finally some variables are by nature truly exogenous.
Demand is probably the most important variable that was not fully endogenized. The
difficulty that arises if we were to endogenize demand is for example that we would have to
estimate cross-price elasticities with competing goods to assess changes in market shares.
Such an exercise would demand mass data of the target market if we were to analyze a
market economy with the standard econometric tools. In the case of a formerly command
oriented economy the analyst might have to resort to other estimation methods. Just
imagine given reasonable and defendable answers to the question of how much the market
share on the Chinese import lumber market would change if the import price of Russian
lumber price were 10% lower than that of its competitors. Such considerations and many
others have left me convinced that the role of demand should be analyzed by scenario
analysis and not be pinned down by clever reasoning using complicated response functions
based on probably weak and hardly defendable assumptions and few data.
The art of making the static model dynamic is determined by transition conditions for the
endogenized variables and finding the appropriate scenarios for the exogenous variables.
For the latter it is also important to take the interdependence of the variables into account.
We decided not to use a Markow switching model, in the narrow sense, to describe the
formation of new capacity. In our particular context, a Markov switching model in a
narrow sense could briefly be described in the way that variables after the static phase
are adjusted by a transition matrix determining the evolution of the respective variable
over time. Each element in the transition matrix has a statistical distribution. If we
were to apply transition matrices of that sort we would to some extent loose control over
the model. Moreover, we need to consider the fact that we already used uncertainty
in the static model. Another reason, which is more connected with investment is that
the possible user should implicitly model investment uncertainty by playing with the
parameters driving investments. One can argue that contract uncertainty, modeled by
(σξQS
jt
, σ
(.)
θ , σ
C
t ), is a one-to-one correspondence to investment uncertainty. Intuitively this
is to say that if a contractor or a contractee is unreliable in a trading procedure as
described in the static phase he/she will be an unreliable investment partner resulting in
project failures. Following this line of interpretation we face a Markov switching model
in a wider sense, where the project failure rate is modeled implicitly by the set-up of the
contract procedure of product delivery.
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2.2.1 Investment and capacity changes
The first element to be discussed in greater detail is investments. Investment and divest-
ment bring about an adaptation of the allocation pattern of productive capacities due to
changes in the economic conditions. Investment should reflect the current and expected
economic situation. Mainly two questions are of interest when discussing investment.
“Where and when should one invest?”is to be answered. In the model approach these
questions are related to a number of variables. Investment is related to the current alloca-
tion of capacity, the current supply pattern, current and expected profitability, strategic
capital targeted to particular markets, and a number of behavioral patterns like the will-
ingness of producers to reinvest in the same activities. In the model transition conditions
for capacity changes from t to t+ 1 are described by12,
Y¯it+1 = Y¯it +∆Y¯
i
it −∆Y¯ dit . (2.6)
In the current version of the model three separate investment cycles have to be taken
into account. There are two independent investment cycles and divestment. Capacity
that will be available to each producer in the up-coming period, Y¯it+1, is made up of the
sum of already existing capacities, Y¯it, plus capital additions determined in the dynamic
phase,∆Y¯ iit, minus capital assets ∆Y¯
d
it that are depreciating due to over capacity of a
particular producer. Capacity additions or investment cycles are again the sum of two
parts. The first being capital generated by own profits, as described in equation 2.7.
Equation 2.7 shows the potential investment generated by own resources. However, the
potential set by investment from the ’cash flow’ has to be adjusted by a constraint set as
described in equation 2.10.
ipiit =
t∑
1
βt(
∑
j
(πijt̺t)−
t−1∑
1
ipiit) =
=
t∑
1
βt(
∑
j
(
∑
k
̺t(Yijtk(P¯jtk − (CPijt + CTijt)))−
t−1∑
1
ipiit) (2.7)
Equation 2.7 says that the potential set of capital addition, ipiit, that stems from own re-
sources is calculated by the discounted difference of total accumulated profits dedicated to
the product,
∑t
1(
∑
j πijt̺t), and past production related capital investment expenditures∑t
1 i
pi
it. The discount factor, i.e. interest rate, is denoted as βt. Total accumulated profits,∑t
1(
∑
j πijt̺t), are calculated by the assumption that a portion ̺t of profits generated each
year is not reinvested in new productive assets, but in other projects 13. ̺t is allowed to
vary over time as indicated by the subscript. Initial profits (
∑
j πijt=0) and initial invest-
ments (ipiit=0) were set equal to zero in the model.
The second component of investments is foreign (extra-enterprise) venture capital. This
foreign investment is distributed among enterprises that still have a future market po-
tential, measured as their market position at the stage T (see equation 2.14), at a given
market. Total foreign investment capital, Ifjt, targeted to market j in period t is distributed
12Notational remark: If one of the subscripts is dropped this means that the sum in reference to the
dropped subscript is calculated i.e. ,Y¯iT =
∑
j Y¯ijT .
13At various visits to enterprises of the forest industry of Russia it was observed that large portions
of capital generated evaded the country or were invested in leisure projects or other non-product related
investments.
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among the i competitors for foreign investment capital according to their relative differ-
ence in the market potential ((YiT − Y¯it)). In this set up, for example, a currently small
producer close to Vladivostok is more likely to receive venture capital additions than a
currently larger producer in Yakutia 14.
ifijt =
(YijT − Y¯ijt)∑
i(YijT − Y¯ijt)
Ifjt
where we define
Y¯ijt =
Yijt∑
j Yijt
Y¯it (2.8)
In order to calculate the difference between the future market position evaluated at time t,
YijT , and the current capacity, Y¯it, for each individual market, capacities were distributed
according to their current supply scheme as shown in the second line of equation 2.8.
The two investment components, ipiit, i
f
ijt , are still in monetary units and need to be
converted into physical capital units. This is shown in equation 2.9 where the monetary
units are divided by the unit cost of productive capacity, Ccapjlt , of product l and market j
at time t.
∆Y¯ iit =
∑
j
∆Y¯ iijt =
∑
j
(ipiijt +
∑
j i
f
ijt)
Ccapjlt
(2.9)
The constraints for investment, as shown below 2.10, require that out of the set of potential
investment projects, i.e. the collection of all ∆Y¯ iit, only projects of sufficient size are
allowed 15. Further it is demanded that projects must be prospective in the sense that
supply at the ’optimal’ allocation (YiT ) is larger than todays capacity (Y¯it).
∆Y¯ iit > 0↔ πj + ij > 0↔
{
∆Y¯ iit ≥ ∆Y min
(YiT − Y¯it) > 0 (2.10)
In cases where the capital addition is greater than the difference to the optimal supply
allocation, i.e. ∆Y¯ iit ≥ (YiT − Y¯it), I set the investment volume equal to the difference
between the capacity of today and supply at the ’optimal’ state at time T plus an ad-
ditional allowable volume for overshooting. We will denote this latter circumstance by
∆Y¯ iit = (YiT − Y¯it) + ∆Y o where ∆Y o denotes the allowable volume for overshooting.
∆Y¯ dit defines the lost capital stock due to excess capacity and depreciation of Soviet type
technology, Y¯ Oit , of producer i. Excess capacity occurs if capacity that was inherited or
built over time is not employed due to the economic supply and demand scheme as calcu-
lated by equation 2.1. Physical excess capacity depreciates at rate δt where δt < 1. Due
to the fact that the old Soviet type technology, Y¯ Oit , is in most cases worn out and can not
be maintained even if used already, these old capacities ’naturally’ depreciate at a rate of
δ∗t ≤ 1.
∆Y¯ dit = (Y¯it −
∑
j
Yijt)δt + Y¯
O
it δ
∗
t (2.11)
Investment and loss of physical assets mutually exclude each other. This I try to illustrate
in 2.12. Here I simply state that if depreciation is larger than zero, investment activities
14This of course is only true if αTt is sufficiently small at time t which will be the case in all scenarios.
15For ∆Ymin is demanded that ∆Ymin ≥ 1
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are canceled for this particular year and if the enterprise actively is allowed to invest no
depreciation according to our definition can take place.
∆Y¯ dit > 0↔ πj + ij = 0↔ ∆Y¯ iit = 0
this implies that
∆Y¯ iit > 0↔ ∆Y¯ dit = 0 (2.12)
The final constraint for capacities is that they are bounded from below as depicted in 2.13.
This is motivated by the believe that an enterprise needs to be of a certain minimum size,
Y¯ min, in order to stay in business. The criteria for the selection of the proper Y¯ min can be
based on either technological or economic reasoning. Another strategy for the appropriate
selection of Y¯ min would be to consult existing data.
Y¯ min ≥ Y¯it+1 (2.13)
2.2.2 The ’quasi-optimal’ supply pattern at time T
The calculation of the quasi-optimal state, in equation 2.14, follows exactly the same
procedure as discussed in the static phase. Parameters are adjusted such that the quasi-
optimal state, at time T , are set according to the considerations discussed in the paragraph
of optimal behavior in section 2.1. The quasi-optimal state is permanently updated as the
exogenous variable cost, determining costs at time T , is a function of costs at time t i.e.
CPiT + CTijT = f
cp(CPit) + f
ct(CTijt).Further, ΩijT changes in each period since current
capacities change from one period to the other. This causes some inertia in the evolution
pattern of capacity building and is motivated by the fact that producers can base their
decisions on information that is available at time t. Thus the effects of technological /
price shocks and changes in the competitive position of enterprises can not be anticipated
by the agents. The optimal solution for the buyer is computed as follows,
YijT k =
(
π
ηjT
ijkTΩijT∑
j(π
ηjT
ijkTΩijT )
USijTQ
)
(DjTAjTkU
B
ijTkQ
) =
=


(P¯jTkUBijTkP −CPiTUCiT −CTijT )ηjT (1 +
Y¯
αj
it∑
j
Y¯
αj
it
ωjT )
∑
j((P¯jTkU
B
ijTkP
−CPiTUCiT −CTijT )ηjT (1 + Y¯
αj
iT∑
j
Y¯
αj
iT
ωjT ))
USijTkQ

 (DjTAjTkUBijTkQ)
where
Yijtk > 0 if


Yijtk ≥ Y minij∑
k
∑
j YijT k ≤ Y¯iT∑
k
∑
i YijT k ≤ ¯DjTk
CPiT + CTijT ≤ P¯jTkUBijTkP∑
k
∑
i
∑
j YijeTk ≤ R¯eT
YijT k = 0 if else. (2.14)
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YijT k . . .Output of producer i which is delivered to market j
in the quasi-optimal state T in kth tender
πijkT . . .Unit profit of producer i at market j
in kth tender at the quasi-optimal state T
ΩijT . . .Coefficient of comparative non-technological scale effects
of producer i at market j at the quasi-optimal state T
CPiT . . .Unit production cost of producer i at the quasi-optimal state T
UCiT . . .Random variable drawn form a truncated normal
distribution with E(UCiT ) = γt ≤ 1 and V AR(UCiT ) = σCT at time T
CTijT . . .Transportation cost per unit for producer i to market j at time T
ηjT . . .Degree of profit maximization at market j at time T . ηjT ǫℜ+
ωjT . . .Coefficient non-technological scale effects
at market j at time T . ωjT ǫℜ+
AjTk . . .Parameter determining the size of tender volumes for the kth auction
at market j at time T . AjTkǫ]0, 1]
UBijTkP . . . Price uncertainty. Random number drawn from
a uniform distribution for market j
with E(UBijTkP ) = θ
P
jT and V AR(U
B
ijTkP
) = σθP
jT
at time T .
UBijTkQ . . . Contract uncertainty of buyer. Random number drawn
from a uniform distribution for market j
with E(UBijTkQ) = θ
QB
jT and V AR(U
B
ijTkQ
) = σθQB
jT
at time T .
USijTkQ . . . Contract uncertainty of seller. Random number drawn from
a uniform distribution for market j
with E(USijTkQ) = ξ
QS
jT and V AR(U
S
ijTkQ
) = σ
ξ
QS
jT
at time T .
DjT . . .Total tender volume at market j at time T
Y¯iT . . . Production capacity of producer i at time T of technology l.
αj . . .Degree of non-technological scale effects. αjǫℜ
Y minij . . .Minimum contract size. Y
min
ij ǫℜ+
P¯jTk . . .Vector of maximum total cost at market j where
transaction is allowed at time T in kth iteration
ReT . . .Biological resource constraint (AAC) in eco-region e at time T
Overall, the set-up of dynamics of the model is very similar to a standard inter tem-
poral stochastic optimization procedure solving time-continuous stochastic optimization
problems. The distinguishing feature of equation array 2.12 is that we do not necessarily
arrive at an optimal solution in T , however, there is a persisting tendency to converge
to this state. Perfect congruence with the optimal state, as approximated by equation
array 2.14, is not obtained due to either insufficient resources, inter alia natural resources,
investment capital, lack of demand, or due to the stochastic behavior of contract building.
Secondly, the optimal state is a moving target making it difficult to converge to.
2.2.3 Price determination
It is generally accepted among economists that prices need to adapt according to the
interaction of demand and supply. In fact, most mainstream economists believe that
price rigidities explain departures from trend growth and equilibrium states (Burda and
Wyplosz 1993) [33]. In the Russian case, prices are rather rigid due to fixed minimum
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export prices and information lags. This is especially true for the export oriented forest
industry where minimum export prices are regularly fixed by governmental organizations.
The model tries to account for some of these imperfections.
In principal the model allows two approaches to introduce the role of prices in the allo-
cation pattern of productive capacity. First prices can be determined by an exogenous
model, i.e. the price path can be estimated by an independent modeling effort and enter
then the tender model as an exogenous variable. Price development should then be mod-
eled with econometric methods. There again we can take two different routes. The first
would be to resort to time-series regression models. However, this class of models like
AR(ρ), ARMA, ARIMA, ARCH, GARCH and many others are only sensible to apply
if the analyst has a large quantity of data at hand. This would be the fact if one were
to analyze a time-series of daily stock market prices over a couple of years. However,
such data are not available to us for the markets analyzed. Moreover, such models show
predictive power only for short-term predictions.
The second approach to be taken is to endogenize price changes. The price changes are
then directly determined by the model variables given some assumptions on the process
of price determination. This is from a computational and a model building point of view
not a trivial task since the price change depends essential on all other variables and coef-
ficients of the model. Hence, it becomes difficult to make a correct and fast diagnosis of
price fluctuations predicted by the model.
In the model price changes, as can be seen in equation 2.15, become a function of the
expected supply slack, the expected total investments, and the current profitability level
of the industry at distinct markets.
∆Pjt = f
∗(
Et(ssnett+t′)/t
′ +
∑
i(CijtYijt)∑
i
∑
k(PijktYijkt)
)
= f∗(
[Et(ssjt+t′)− Et(Ijt+t′(If , Ipi, Id))]/t′ +∑i(CijtYijt)∑
i
∑
k(PijktYijkt)
) (2.15)
where
∆Pijt . . .Change of price of product l which is delivered
to market j at time t
E(ssnet) . . .Expected net supply slack of product l
which is dedicated to market j at time t i
E(ssijlt) . . .Expected supply slack of product l which is
dedicated to market j at time t
E(Iijlt(If , Ipi, Id)) . . .Expected total net investment to market j at time t∑
i πijlt . . .Total current profits gained at market j
with product l.
E(ssnet), the expected net supply slack, can be seen as the expected supply slack, see
equation 2.16, corrected for the total expected capacity investments targeted to market
j. The calculation in equation 2.15 follows the logic that prices change according to the
ratio of total capital requirements to total revenue as calculated at time t. Thus, prices
adapt in such a way that there is a tendency to market clearing. If total predicted capital
requirements for the upcoming period, with prediction period of t′ years, is larger than
todays total revenue than prices increase and vice versa. This would also mean that there
is a tendency that on the aggregate firms will earn zero expected profits.
The expected supply slack of a given product at a given market is given by,
E(ssjlt) = Et(Dj,t+t′)−
∑
i
Y¯ ijt (2.16)
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where
E(ssijt) ≤ 0 ifEt(Dj,t+t′) ≥ ∑i Y¯ ijt . . .under supply
E(ssijt) ≥ 0 ifEt(Dj,t+t′) ≤ ∑i Y¯ ijt . . . oversupply.
In other words the expected supply slack is the difference between the current supply,
which is the installed capacity, and the expected demand at time t of the product con-
cerned at market j in period t+ t′. In our case the latter is the predicted demand. In the
simulation runs presented t′ was set 2 years. In other words this difference expresses the
supply gap that would arises if the economic supply would not change and demand would
grow or fall in the upcoming two periods. t′ is hypothesized to be the economic planning
horizon of the relevant agents determining price formation at market j.
The total net expected investments are made up of three components. The first being
foreign or outside investments If and the second being investments financed out of the
company profits, Ipi, dedicating capacities to market j. The third component is depreci-
ation capital. The sum of all three components is expressed in equation 2.17.
E(Ij(I
f , Ipi, Id)|Infft ) = Et(Ifjt+t′|Infft ) + Et(
∑
i
Ipiijt+t′|Infpit )− Et(
∑
i
Idijt+t′)
If , Ipi, Id . ≥ 0
Et(
∑
i
Ipiijt+t′|Infpit ) = (
t∑
t−t∗
∑
i
πijt + (t
′ − 1)∑
i
πijt)|Infpit
Et(
∑
i
Idijt+t′) = (t
′ − 1)∑
i
(∆Y¯ dit
Yijt∑
i Yijt
). (2.17)
Et(I
f
jt+t′|Infft ) is the conditional expected foreign or external investment at time t + 1.
The information set Infft constrains I
f
t+t′ as discussed in 2.12. Et(
∑
i I
pi
t+1|Infpit ) describes
the conditional expected investment out of own financial resources made up of contribu-
tions of individual enterprises targeting capital to particular markets in the up-coming
period given an information set Infpit at time t. This information set contains information
on accumulated profits ready for investment with additional information on investment
constraints which have been discussed more closely in the investment section. Depreciat-
ing capital, which is due to oversupply to certain markets, is originally calculated on the
aggregate of an enterprise. By building the ratio ((Yijt)/(
∑
i Yijt) one can make inference
which markets are over-supplied.
This modeling approach allows to have investment and consequently prices to be deter-
mined by the strategies of the agents being active on the concerned markets. That is to
say that, e.g. Japanese investments in areas which are targeted or are expected to be
targeted to re-import the produced product will directly influence the import / export
price for Japanese traders.
f∗(.) is a logistic filter function which either dampens or enhances the effect of the ratio
of total expected capital requirement and total revenues on prices calculated on the basis
of E(ssnet),
∑
i(CijtYijt) and
∑
i
∑
k(PijktYijkt). The logistic
16 function 2.18 (see some ex-
amples of the function with changing parameters in figure 2.1) allows to introduce price
inertia by setting bounds to the price change, ∆Pijt, and additionally allows to ’play’ with
the elasticities of the calculated ratio. The latter is determined by c4.
∆Pjt = c1− c2
c3− exp(E(ssnet−
∑
i
(CijtYijt)∑
i
∑
k
(PijktYijkt)
) ∗ c4
(2.18)
16In the field of forestry this function is used to describe growth phenomena of trees and populations.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the logistic filter (Legend refers to the coefficients of equation 2.18: c1/c2/c3).
where
c1 . . .Sets the position of the inflection point
c2 . . .Defines the upper bound of price changes
c3 . . .Defines the lower bound of price changes
c4 . . .Elasitcity of the capital requirement/revenue ratio determined by the slope
of the curve between c2 and c3.
The price level of the initial auction (k = 1), for the up-coming period can now be
determined by taking into account that prices are bounded. The boundedness is achieved
by implementing the following constraint set,
P¯jtk=1 =


Pminjt if ∆PjtP¯jt−1k=1 < P
min
jt
∆PjtP¯jt−1k=1 if Pminjt ≤ ∆PjtP¯jt−1k=1 ≤ Pminjt
Pmaxjt if ∆PjtP¯jt−1k=1 > P
max
jt .
As stated initially in this paragraph, we observe not only price changes in certain bounds
each year but also minimum, Pminjt , and maximum, P
max
jt , absolute price levels. In the
case of export prices we refer to the officially reported ’recommended minimum price
level for products of the Russian forest industry for country j for the 1 quarter of 1995’
(Minimalnie recomenduemii uroven zen na Rossiiskuju lesobumaschnuju produkzijy, past-
blejaemuju b j 17, na kvartal 1995 god) (ROSLESPROM 20.01.1995) [18]. For internal
markets the minimum price level was set to a percentage of the whole sale prices at the
Moscow commodity exchange 18 with regional adjustment coefficients. In the simulations
it is assumed that the absolute price level constraints resume to be valid.
Setting the initial price level is one component of changing the average price level at the
concerned market and is one possibility to model the overall price development. Changing
17In this case j stands for the country which can equally be regarded as export market j. If the export
market consists of a bundle of different countries with different minimum recommended minimum price
levels the weighted average is calculated with the export value of product l as a weight.
18Special thanks goes to Dr. Charles A. Backman who donated these data.
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the price increase from one tender price to the other is another way how we can equilibrate
price and demand via price setting. The mechanism follows the same logic as we applied in
the previous equations 2.15,2.16,2.17. The only difference of course is that the parameters
of the logistic filter 2.18 will be set differently. Thus we will denote the coefficients
differently as can be seen in equation 2.19
∆+Pjt = c1
+ − c2
+
c3+ − exp(E(ssnet−
∑
i
(CijtYijt)∑
i
∑
k
(PijktYijkt)
) ∗ c4+
(2.19)
where
c1+ . . . Sets the position of the inflection point
c2+ . . .Defines the upper bound of the change in price
c3+ . . .Defines the lower bound of the change in price
c4+ . . .Elasitcity of the capital requirement/revenue ratio determined
by the slope of the curve between c2 and c3.
Note, however, that the increase in prices in the ascending price tender auction depend
also on the expected net supply slack. In other words if the initial price falls the price
increase is smaller. A slower increasing price affects both the variance and the mean of the
prices achieved at the particular market. Both the variance and the mean decrease with
slower increasing prices. Prices do increase slower if the expected supply slack becomes
smaller, which in turn leads to stronger competition.
Let me denote the price change from one tender to another in a given period as ∆P+jt =
P¯jtk−1 − P¯jtk. Then we can write for k ≥ 2,
P¯jtk =
{
∆P+jt + P¯jtk−1 if ∆P
+
jt + P¯jtk−1 ≤ Pminjt
Pmaxjt if ∆P
+
jt + P¯jtk−1 > P
max
jt .
2.2.4 Changes in uncertainties
Price uncertainties (UBijtkP ) and contract uncertainties ( U
B
ijtkQ
, USijtkQ) are subject to two
different processes. The first being an exogenous process of uncertainty and the second
an endogenous process which is dependent on the current average product prices. The
parameters for modeling contract uncertainties are defined in equation array 2.20
(Up− Low)Bjt = υBjt(Up− Low)Bjt−1(1−
P¯jtk=1 − P¯jt−1k=1
P¯max − P¯jtk=1 ι
B)
(Up− Low)Sjt = υSjt(Up− Low)Sjt−1(1 +
P¯jtk=1 − P¯jt−1k=1
P¯max − P¯jtk=1 ι
S) (2.20)
Up and Low denote the upper and lower bound of the uniform distribution for buyers (B)
and sellers (S) which changes over time according to the relative distance of the current
base price P¯jtk=1 to the maximal possible price. The difference or the distance between
Up and Low is the direct measure of uncertainty. Up and Low determine the variance
of the different types of uncertainty. From equation 2.20 we can see that uncertainty of
buyers is increasing with increasing base prices whereas sellers decrease the uncertainty.
In the current version of the model the expected values of the random numbers drawn
are θQBjt = ξ
QS
jt = (Up − Low)Bjt/2 = (Up − Low)Sjt/2 6= 1. In this case, uncertainty
does decrease or increase the aggregate price level of the products traded. ι determines
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differences in the speed of adjustment of uncertainty to changing prices by changing the
variance of the uniform distribution. The variances are defined in equation 2.21
σθQB
jt
=
(υBjt(Up− Low)Bj )2
12
σ
ξ
QS
jt
=
(υSjt(Up− Low)Sj )2
12
(2.21)
In the model υjt is a value of a function which is a smaller unity and homogeneously
decreasing with t and can take different values for sellers (S) and buyers (B). υjt models
the exogenous process of uncertainty. υjt was introduced to include the effect of learning
over time. In the period of economic transition, uncertainty in the business environment
is a very important factor determining the success of the forest industry. As soon as the
business environment will improve the degree of uncertainty will considerably decrease.
The process of adaptation, however, is linked to the overall legal and political infras-
tructure and socio-economic peculiarities of the concerned markets. The analyst can by
simulation explore the changes in the pattern of uncertainty and model the evolutionary
path of learning which is in reality and in the model determined exogenously.
There is also a hysteresis effect in the uncertain behavior of the contract partners. The
random numbers are drawn not every period but every t∗r period. Thus there is a persis-
tancy in the behavior of individual traders over a certain period determined by t∗r.
Interaction between contract reliability and total demand and investment
Feedback loops between e.g. contract reliability and the concomitant reduction of the
total investment and demand volumes are determined only to a limited extent endoge-
nously in the model.
Let me first discuss how total investments are affected. Investments as we have seen in
equation 2.9 consist of two parts. The level of foreign venture capital is not directly in-
fluenced by contract uncertainty in the current version of the model. The interaction can
only be included by an external functional relationship between the contract uncertainty
and foreign investments. This has to be done prior to the model runs since foreign invest-
ment has to be determined in the calibration phase. Only if foreign investments equals
the supply slack one could develop a response function where investment would decrease
with the degree of uncertainty. Own capital resources generated on the other hand are
directly decreased by the influence of UBijtkP . This is true for two reasons: (1) the expected
value of the price uncertainty is smaller or equal unity (i.e. E(UBijtkP ≤ 1), (2) not all least
cost producers can use their capacity which in the aggregate decreases the profit level and
thus future capacities via decreased investments from own resources. Additionally least
cost producers might loose unused capacity which has to be rebuilt again.
The model is designed in a way that markets do not necessarily have to be cleared. Sup-
ply slacks can occur. The size of the demand slack is also partly influenced by contract
uncertainty. There are essentially three ways on how increases in contract and price
uncertainties influences the actual supply,
1. Lower aggregate investment due to decreased profitability 19
19Note that the profitability of an individual company decreases whereas expenditures of the buyer
increase. Depending on how price development is modeled it could occur that aggregate profits would
rise over time due the increased supply slacks which leads to increased prices. This effect, however, is
buffered by the calculation referred to in point (3).
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2. Decrease of aggregate capacity participating in the tender
3. Prices enter the demand equation
As mentioned earlier potential demand Djt enters the model as an exogenous process.
Demand is determined by equation 3.12. GNP enters exogenously whereas prices are
determined by the model. This approach, so nice it might look at the surface, lacks an
important feature of realism. This is that both prices and aggregate uncertainty have
a considerable impact on the market share of geographically dispersed suppliers. In the
current version I did not include such a response function.
From a methodological point of view the only sensible way to overcome the problem of
proper response functions would be to quantify the relationship of contract uncertainty
and affiliated aggregates by empirical experiments with real agents. This, however, would
by no means be possible due to financial and time constraints of the study irrespective of
the methodological questions and uncertainties related to such an approach.
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Chapter 3
Additional modules
This chapter is organized in such a way that I discuss two additional modules that were
necessary to be attached to the core model. In principle the core model is designed in
such a way that any kind of additional modules can be added. In the case of the Siberian
forest industry we are on the one hand faced with a very unreliable database concerning
the producers and on the other hand demand equations have to be constructed in order
to give reasonable predictions for export potentials and domestic consumption.
3.1 Cost determination by using an engineering
approach - The Cost Module
In this dissertation, not the entire forest industry of Siberia is analyzed, but only two
product lines, l = 2, are dealt with. These are roundwood production and lumber pro-
duction. Production patterns of pulp, paper, plywood and reconstituted panel products
are not directly analyzed. However, positive externalities or let us call it technological
synergies like chips produced in a lumber mill that is combined with a e.g. pulp mill
are taken care of in the analysis. As previously mentioned data collected from individual
producers and in particular cost information is highly unreliable in Russia. This has lead
me to not rely on this type of questionable information but rather model costs using an
engineering approach. Engineering knowledge has been compiled from various sources
located in Russia and internationally.
3.1.1 Harvesting
At this point I will try to develop a straight forward method to derive costs of production
by using engineering type productivity functions from the latest literature and use market
values for the relevant input factors. Roundwood production costs are calculated assum-
ing harvester / forwarder technology 1. Subsequent transportation to the lower landing
is modeled by a Russian engineering model. This model will be referred to as the Petrov
model (Petrov 1995 [38]) named after the responsible author of a project report to IIASA.
For the description of the costs of lumber production also an engineering type of model
1Find a detailed description of the Russian logging operations in the following Western literature:
Blandon 1985, Obersteiner 1995 [34], Strakhov et al. 1996[44], Wood Resources International 1996 [56].
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was developed.
The developed cost functions are of great importance for the simulation exercise. The
variables driving costs i.e. the geography, the forest resource itself and the management
scheme do in fact define to a great deal the competitiveness of the upstream industry.
In the current version of cost calculation there is only one technology assumed. This
technology is the same for all producers. This assumption can of course be subject to
criticism. However, let me already now make some comments on this assumption. In the
current state of the Siberian Forest industry, technology is rather homogeneous. This is
true for harvesting operations and lumber production. The only exception is that some
large wood working combines produce with Western technology. As discussed earlier in
this section the positive effects of lumber mills that are combined with other upstream
production using wood chips are taken indirectly into account in the analysis.
During transition, however, producers will make different technological choices. In the
model I differentiate two different quasi technologies. In the allocation rule as discussed
in equation 2.1 we discriminate between products produced form old capacity, i.e., ca-
pacity that was inherited through the privatization process and is essentially of Russian
standard and products produced by the western technology standards. Again, to make
this clear, the costs for the two technologies employed are equal. What changes, however,
is the probability to receive a contract due to the difference in ωtx if xo 6= xn changes.
This leads to the effect that the relative competitiveness of an enterprise changes with the
addition of new capacities due to a more favorable ωtx . Moreover, enterprise information
that were collected by Russian collaborators to IIASA’s Siberian Forest Study, covers cost
information only for a small subset of the entire collection of enterprises. If we were now
to use this information the question arises of how can one make inference on the costs
of all other producers. The prediction of cost would virtually be impossible and by no
means reflect reality.
For harvesting operations one should ideally use different technologies for different en-
vironmental conditions. In this case a different technology would be employed in e. g.
mountainous regions. Substantial work has already been put into answering this question.
At this stage is would be too premature to present results given the currently available
information 2.
Let me continue with the description of cost determination for harvesting. Harvesting
costs per unit of output are calculated every period as a function of the updated total
capacity. I distinguish between capital cost, labor costs, and fuel or material costs. Taxes
and overhead costs are then taken as a percentage of these three cost items. This is
described in equation 3.1.
κtott = [(κ
l
t + κ
M
t + κ
C
t ) ∗ (1 + τt/100) ∗ (1 +Ot/100)]/Y¯it (3.1)
κtott . . .Total cost per one cubic meter roundwood ($ / CUM)
κlt . . .Total labor cost of roundwood production in period t ($)
κMt . . .Total material cost of roundwood production in period t ($)
κCt . . .Total capital expenditures for roundwood production in period t ($)
τt . . .Tax rate at time t calculated on the basis of net costs (%)
Ot . . .Over head costs at time t calculated on the basis of net costs (%)
Labor costs per unit output, as defined in equation 3.2, in turn are calculated on the basis
2There are certain unsolved problems connected to the available data on terrain condition, road
density, relief and others.
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of the number of machines employed which are handled by labor given the capacity at
time t, unit labor costs at time t, and a labor overhead factor reflecting additional labor
necessary for organizational and support duties.
κlt = (Harvt ∗ ςHarv + Fwdt ∗ ςFwd + Truckt ∗ ςTruck)
∗ κult ∗ (1 +Olt ∗ 100) (3.2)
Harvt . . .Number of harvesters needed given the output capacity at time t
and productivity at time time t (physical units)
Fwdt . . .Number of forwarders needed given the output capacity at time t
and productivity at time time t (physical units)
Truckt . . .Number of logging trucks needed given the output capacity at time t
and productivity at time time t (physical units)
ςHarv . . .Number of working shifts for harvesters
ςFwd . . .Number of working shifts for forwarders
ςTruck . . .Number of working shifts for trucks
κult . . .Total cost of one unit of labor in period t
Olt . . .Labor specific over head costs at time t (%)
Here again we have to define a number of variables somewhat closer. The number of
machinery used each period mainly depend on the productivity of the machines employed
and how intensive the machinery can be used. The intensity is dependent on the question
of how many hours the machinery can be used for its purpose in the respective period. If
the period is a calendar year than the number of hours a machine can be used depends
on the factor of seasonality, that is the number of days of utilization during the year,
and the average number of hours per day or in other words the number of working shifts.
Equation 3.3 will define the number of respective harvesters as is due to Brunberg 1995 [46]
and was slightly adapted to the Russian circumstances.
Harvt =
Y¯it
Pt(DVt, T r) ∗ dHarv ∗ stdHarv ∗ shHarv ∗ ℜ
Harv
t
Pt =
6000 ∗ dt
(sut(hg) + 56 ∗DV + 80 ∗ Tr/100)Υ (3.3)
Harvt . . .Number of harvesters needed given the output capacity at time t
and productivity at time time t (physical units)
Pt . . .Productivity of a harvester at time t dependent on
average log volume and share problem trees (CUM/h)
dt . . .Down time per hour (percent)
DV WBt . . .Average log volume of harvested logs(see 3.4)
in cubic meter without bark (WB)
Tr . . .Percentage of problem trees (percent)
dHarv . . .Number of days when the harvester is operating (days)
sdtHarv . . .Number of hours of a working shift in harvester operations (hours)
shHarv . . .Number of shifts in harvest operations
ℜHarvt . . .Productivity factor of Russian operators
sut(hg) . . . Set-up time between trees as a function
of the degree of ’High-Grading’(hg)
Υ . . . Species specific adjustment factor for productivity.
The average log volume of harvested logs was estimated from the Blam-database [41]
where I assumed a logarithmic functional relation ship. The simple intuition behind
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picking this functional relationship is that the larger the growing stock per hectar the
more large volume trees will be found at the site. This leads to the fact that the volume
of the single tree increases slower with the average growing stock in a natural forest 3.
The estimated function looks as follows,
DV IB = −3.1362 + 0.7197 ∗GSit
DV WB = 0.92 ∗DV IB − 0.02
√
DV IB (3.4)
Note, however, that equation 3.4 describes the relationship 4 between the growing stock
per hectar on a given site (GSit) with the average harvested volume of timber extracted.
Thus, the measure is of economic and not of ecological nature.
Tr describes the percentage of problem trees. The number of problem trees are according
to Brunberg 1995 [46] mainly related to trees which need to be cut additional times, trees
which are difficult to access and trees which are difficult related to other problems. The
functions developed by Brunberg 1995 [46], explaining Tr were developed for Swedish
conditions and can therefore not be applied one-to-one to Russian conditions. First of
all terrain conditions in Siberia are different and secondly the forest in Siberia that are
given out for harvesting operations are mainly natural forest opposed to secondary forests
in Sweden. However, as can be seen in equation 3.3 the model allows for adjustments.
Furthermore, the Brunberg model is consistent with a model estimated by Guglhoer and
Weixler (1995) with German data, if adjusting the model accordingly. This leads to the
assumption that the Brunberg model can be used more or less univerily if the calibration
is done cautiously.
sut(hg) is according to Brunberg (1989,1991,1995) [46] [13] [45] dependent on the distance
between the logging roads, number of trees per hectar, soil type, the slope of the logging
site and acceleration capacity of the harvester itself. In the current version of the model
only a limited amount of the factors mentioned above are included in the analysis. This
is mainly due to the fact that necessary data are not yet available at an enterprise specific
level. However, in the simulation of the costs one can explore the effects of ’high-grading’
as a factor influencing productivity and consequently costs. ’High-grading’ directly relates
to the ratio between the number of tree growing on the site and the number of trees
harvested 5. Especially, in natural forests one tends to encounter a large number of
small sized trees. Today only a small number of trees is removed from the site under
Siberian management practices. This means that a lot of trees have to be cut first in
order to access the harvestable trees. Such forest management schemes drastically reduce
the productivity of harvesting operations by changing sut(hg). In the case that Russian
technology is used the effect might not be so large. Russian logging operations use tank-
like base machinery with which it is possible to simply drive over trees and shrubs without
cutting.
Originally I tried to follow a methodology develped by Bergstrand(1985) [30], Toplitsch
(1992) [50] and Rinnhofer (1990) [22] to derive the number of forwarders that should
operate together with the harvesters. The functions, especially by Bergstrand(1985) [30],
were too detailed and in fact complicated such that I decided to use a simple approach.
Also dealers of this type of equipment do rely mostly on expert opinion rather than
3This simple reasoning, however, still needs to be tested for natural forests in Siberia.
4Statistical note: The residual sum of squares, degree of freedom and F-value in this estimation were:
Rsq = 0.529, DF = 289, F = 205.65.
5In the simulation runs of the entire model I change the landscape factor, lsi, which indirectly can
also be interpreted as a measure for high grading i.e. the more trees are left the more land is used.
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methodology when it comes to the question of how many forwarders should be combined
with the harvesters operating.
Fwd = Harv ∗ coeffFwd (3.5)
Equation 3.5 shows the simple relationship between the number of harvesters and the
number of forwarders that co-operate. The forwarder coefficient, coeffFwd, mainly de-
pends on the average driving distance between the upper landing (road-side storage),
the harvesting operation, tree volume, and terrain conditions. The driving distance links
back to hg. Forest management is thus also related with the productivity of forwarder
operations. This fact has to be taken into account when determining coeffFwd. More
detailed field experiments concerning the determination of coeffFwd would be desirable
in order to make better assessments of future cost development especially in the light of
changing forest management practices.
The third cost component in equation 3.1 is the trucking operation. The estimated equa-
tion 3.6 is, as mentioned earlier, derived from data supplied by Petrov (1995). The original
data is based on detailed time studies made in Siberian enterprises. The forest roads in
Siberia are often in very bad condition and Russian trucks are different from Western
types. Western types of trucking models used by SkogKalk (1995) [32] and similar ana-
lytical tools developed in Canada and the US (TopM 1996) can not be applied to Russian
conditions given the current situation and the time span of simulation. I am personally
convinced that the Petrov model describes the current Siberian conditions for trucking at
best for the current situation. However, it is believed that in the next few years measures
have to be taken to increase the productivity of this particular phase of the roundwood
production chain. In the simulation we will have to take this factor into account by
adjusting the coefficient in equation 3.6 appropriately.
Truckit =
(LTt + 0.00512 ∗ disti + 0.096 ∗ draini + 0.112 ∗ reliefi
Y¯it ∗ dTruck ∗ stdtruck ∗ shtruck +
+
0.117 ∗Rcond)
Y¯it ∗ dTruck ∗ stdtruck ∗ shtruck (3.6)
dist =
√√√√ Y¯it ∗ 100
GSit ∗ hg ∗ π Y¯itℑils (3.7)
Truckit . . .Number of trucks needed given the output capacity at time t
and productivity at time time t (physical units)
LTt . . .Total loading and unloading time (hours)
disti . . .Distance from the lower to the upper landing (km)
draini . . . Index for road drainage
reliefi . . . Index for road drainage
Rcond . . . Index for road conditions
dTruck . . .Number of days when the truck is operating (days)
sdtTruck . . .Number of hours of a working shift in trucking operations (hours)
shTruck . . .Number of shifts in hauling operations
ℑi . . .Number of years the enterprise is assumed
to operte from the center point
lsi . . .Landscape factor for enterprise i
draini =
{
1 if road is drained
2 if road is without drain
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reliefi =
{
1 if flat terrain
2 if hills and mountains
Rcond =


1 if roads with gravel base
2 if roads with natural soil base with drainage
3 if roads with natural soil base without drainage
The indexes draini, reliefi, Rcond allow to model differences in the forest road conditions
in greater detail. In the current state of the database, however, these two indexes have
to be set at average values due to lack of detailed information. It is expected that in the
near future these detailed factors can also be taken into account as soon as data are ready.
The distance calculation is based on a central gravity approach. This is to say that the
lower landing does not change its geographic location for the time period ℑi. ℑi can
be set according to the type of forest leasing, logging enterprises can choose. ℑi also
relates to the assumptions to be made concerning the sustainable management of the
forests. In this case ℑi has to equal the average rotation period of the respective forests.
Information concerning this management type is potentially available from the modeling
efforts made by Korovin et al.(1996) [16]. Each year it is assumed that the enterprises
logs out a small piece of the total pie of forest land leased or allocated to the concerned
harvesting enterprises. Thus the average transportation distance does not change over
time. In reality this assumption might be violated as logging enterprises do move their
operations as close to the market as possible and do not take into account increasing
future transportation distances due to their centered extraction activities. This problem
may be linked to a number of reasons including the form of ownership, present economic
hardship and general management practice.
After having defined in great detail the parts of the engineering model I will now turn
back to the cost calculation. The next cost item after having defined labor costs per unit
output 6 are material costs as defined in equation 3.11.
κMt = Harvd
HarvstdHarvshHarvUHarvt + Fwdd
FwdstdFwdshFwdUFwdt +
+ TruckdTruckstdTruckshTruckUTruckt . (3.8)
In this equation Ut denotes the unit costs per hour ($/hour). Material costs in this case
comprise cost items like fuel, lubricants and others to run the logging equipment. Repair
costs, however, are included in κC , as can be seen in equation 3.9, and thus are treated
as part of the fixed costs.
κCt =
Harv̺HarvCHarv
shHarv̟Harvt
+
Fwd̺FwdCFwd
shFwd̟Fwdt
+
+
Truck̺TruckCTruck
shTruck̟Truckt
+ CroadY¯ ξit . (3.9)
̺. . . .Coefficient of repair where ̺. > 1
C . . . .Market price of one unit of respective machinery
including interest ($)
̟Harvt . . .Amortization period of the respective machinery (years)
ξ . . .Coefficient to penalize large harvesting operations
in repect to fixed road costs
6Note that in the current set up of the model once the unit costs are determined total costs are inelastic
to the actual supply. That is to say that the variable cost item e.g. labor cost does not change the total
unit cost even if the capacity is not fully used.
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̺Harv, CHarv, ̟Harvt are taken from companies selling the respective machinery on the
Russian market (TIMBERJACK 1996). ξ was included in order to reflect the fact that
with increasing size of a roundwood producer the road maintenance costs increase on a
relative basis due to the large ramification of the road network, due to the fact that distant
areas can not be maintained like in a smaller enterprise 7. Croad is a constant number and
hence the adjustment with Y¯ ξit has to be made to come closer to the real pattern of cost
distribution.
3.1.2 Saw milling
In the model results presented in this dissertation it is assumed for simplicity reasons
that lumber mills produce all required inputs roundwood themselves. The calculation
of roundwood production for lumber mills follow the same methodology as described
in equations 3.1 to 3.9. The milling process in terms of cost calculation is calculated
analogous to equation 3.1. The milling costs are now denoted with an additional ∗ as can
be seen in equation 3.10.
κtot∗t = [(κ
l∗
t + κ
tot
t Y¯
∗
itεit + κ
C∗
t )κ¯
M∗
t ∗ 100
∗ (1 + τ ∗t /100) ∗ (1 +O∗t /100)]/Y¯ ∗it (3.10)
κtot∗t . . .Total cost for the production of one cubic meter lumber ($/CUM)
κl∗t . . .Total labor cost of lumber production in period t($)
κtott . . .Sawlog costs per unit in period t($/CUM)(see 3.1 )
Y¯ ∗it . . .Capacity for lumber production at time t in CUM
εit . . .Technical input/output coefficient (CUMwood/CUM lumber.εit ≥ 1
κ¯M∗t . . .Coefficient for material cost of lumber production in period t(%)
κC∗t . . .Total capital expenditures for lumber production in period t ($)
τ ∗t . . .Tax rate at time t calculated on the basis of net costs (%)
O∗t . . .Over head costs at time t calculated on the basis of net costs (%)
In comparison to roundwood production there are, of course, some changes to be made in
the saw milling module. The first change is the calculation of labor productivity. Physical
labor productivity was recalculated based on Hogel (1994) [31] and is 8,
P ∗ = −153.3 + 550.83 ln(Y¯it) (3.11)
where in this context P ∗ defines the physical labor productivity in units labor per year at
a given output level. Another factor that needs to be taken into account is the coefficient
of utilization of roundwood in the milling process. Let me denote this coefficient as εit. As
already discussed earlier, this coefficient changes if the lumber mill happens to be located
at a wood working combine that uses the wood chips produced by the lumber mill. This
information is captured by the index i in εit. In the case of integration εiI t can be set to
unity if iI denotes integration. In any case εiIt < εit for i 6= iI .
Additionally, material costs in lumber production are not separately calculated but enter
as a percentage of the total labor and capital costs as denoted by κ¯M∗t . The capital costs
take scale effects into account. As scale effects enter the model, indirectly scale effects are
7Note that this is an untested hypothesis.
8In the simulations it became apparent that this function yields implausible results for enterprises
with a production smaller than 30.000 CUM.
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then also included in the material and general costs since these costs enter as additional
shares in the total cost calculation as shown in equation 3.1. The sales tax and the export
duty are added later as discussed in section 2.1.
3.2 Demand prediction
In this section I will try to present three things. First, I will try to motivate the use
of a functional form of the demand equation and shortly describe the methodology of
forecasting. Second, I will present and short describe the econometric techniques that were
employed. Here I describe a special panel data technique 9, the two-way error component
fixed effects regression model, and a short description of a Bayesian estimation approach
which was combined with the panel data estimation 10. In the final part in section 3.2.3
we show results of the estimations with a short description of the markets.
3.2.1 Functional form of demand functions
As forest industry products satisfy different needs, their consumption is dependent on
a number of different indicators. Most frequently forest industry economists estimate
total consumption of forest products in dependence of income, prices, the abundance
of substitute products and the number of consumers. A number of studies emerged
recently discussing these issues for the forest sector and need not be repeated here (Buon-
giorno 1977 [14], Jaakko Poeyry 1995 [39], Sedjo and Lyon 1995 [40], Baudin and Brooks
1995 [11], Apsey and Reed 1995 [49], Nilsson 1996 [42], Solberg et. al. 1996 [43], Romain
1996 [28], Brooks et al. forthcoming [12]). The consumption path of forest products
is mainly linked to the trajectory of GDP. Elasticities change by country groups and
products analyzed. There are of course structural differences between developed and less
developed countries and between countries exporting forest products, due to their natural
endowments and population density, and countries importing them. These differences,
ignored by so many analysts, were of course included in the analysis by carefully distin-
guishing between country groups as is discussed later in section 3.2.4. In the framework
of this analysis we will not disaggregate product groups. It is true that there might be
differences in the lag structure and differences in elasticities of different grades. For the
purposes of our aggregate analysis, however, differentiation between product groups seems
to be justifiable and differences in the effects are hypothesized to equal out in the aggre-
gated analysis and should eventually be captured by the stochastic term in our regression.
The second fundamental variable determining demand 11 of forest products is prices. The
effect of changes in prices captures two phenomena. On the one hand the consumer will
react directly to price changes due to changes in the relative purchasing power and on
the other hand consumers might want to substitute wood or wood products with other
9The two-way error component fixed effects model is described for two reasons. First, the one-way
error component model is just a special case of the two-way error component model were λi = 0. Second,
due to the nature of data the fixed effects model is almost a priori most suited due to the fact that we
observe a fixed set of countries over time. There are by definition no random effects by the sampling
scheme.
10Please, note that for notational convenience the Bayesian estimation is described assuming cross-
sectional data.
11Demand can be interpreted as either total consumption or export/import demand.
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competing products. Elasticities will be changing with the level of GNP 12.
Finally, we have to consider changes in population. Increases in population will, of course,
result in increased consumption and trade of forest products. Differences in the propen-
sity to consume of different age and social classes has been ignored for the time being.
In our analysis we will consider forecasts from different econometric models and in the
case of non-exiting data we will have to resort to analysis of other researchers. The choice
of the model depends on the quality and quantity of data available. The most frequently
estimated equation is defined by equation 3.12. Consumption of import is determined by
a GLS estimator of the following structure,
Yit = α + λt + µi + βGNP logGNPit + βPPit + ǫit
ǫit = ρǫit−1 + uit. (3.12)
where
Yit . . .Output/Import per capita of country i in time period t
α . . . Intercept
λt . . .Time specific intercept
µi . . .Country specific intercept
βGNP . . . Estimated parameter for GNP elasticity
GNP . . .Gross National Product per capita of country i in time period t
βP . . .Estimated parameter for price elasticity
P . . . Import price of country i in time period t
ǫit . . .AR(1) disturbance
ρ . . .Coefficient of autocorrelation
uit . . .White noise with E(uit) = 0 and E(u2it) = σ
2
u
and Cov(uit, uis) = 0 if t 6= s
. Equa-
tion 3.12 illustrates the relationship between demand, Y , of country i at time t and a time
variant effect λt, the country specific effect µi, the log of GNP of country i at time t, prices
of country i at time t, and an error term. In cases where ρ > 0 the error term is corrected
for autocorrelation of order one (AR(1)). If the latter is the case this transformed model
should be referred to as,
Y ∗it = β′X∗it + ǫ∗it (3.13)
.
The optimal prediction of future demand, Yˆ ∗it+1, given X
∗
it+1 and X
∗
it, is then calculated
by equation 3.14.
Yˆ ∗it+1 = βˆ′X∗it+1 (3.14)
By disassembling Yˆ ∗it+1 we find
Yˆit+1 − ρyit = βˆ′Xit+1 − ρβˆ′Xit (3.15)
Thus, we carry forward a proportion ρ of the estimated disturbance in the preceding
period. This can be justified by the reference,
E(ǫt+1‖ǫt) = ρǫt
(3.16)
12The log allows to model decreasing marginal propensities to consume with increasing income.
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This effect can be interpreted as contracts which have a duration over a calendar year but
also a certain stickiness in the contract building. In this light it seems to be reasonable
that higher-order auto-regression play a minor role in contracts since most of the contracts
are renewed and newly negotiated every year. However, this argumentation is only partly
true. By the correction of autoregressive processes in the residuals one also captures part
of the dynamics of the process. By this pseudo-differencing the growth rate today is also
dependent on yesterday’s growth rate.
It can also be shown that forecasting n periods ahead can be calculated by (Greene
1997 [54]),
Yˆit+1 − ρnyit = βˆ′Xit+1 − ρnβˆ′Xit (3.17)
3.2.2 The two-way fixed effects error component regression model
In this section I give a description of a single regression model with two-way error com-
ponents. We consider its basic assumptions as well as the assumptions on the error com-
ponents, which lead to the fixed and random effects model. To this purpose we heavily
draw on Maddala 1993 [19], Prucha [25] and on Baltagi [20].
The basic model and its assumptions
Let us consider now a single regression model and refer to it as the general model:
yti = αti + xti1βti1 + . . .+ xtiKβtiK + νti
= αti +
K∑
k=1
xtikβtik + νti with i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T
(3.18)
where N and T denote the number of units and time-points, respectively, and on the k-th
explanatory variable. Further νti denotes the (ti)-th disturbance term, αti and βtik stand
for the intercept and slope coefficient. The disturbances µti are typically assumed to be
iid with zero mean and finite variance.
In Equation (3.18) no restrictions are imposed on the coefficients αti and βtik. In general
these restrictions are required for estimations as there are NT observations, but 2NT
coefficients. There are several possibilities to do this. I concentrate on models, where the
intercept varies over units and time and where the slope coefficients are constant.
yti = αti +
K∑
k=1
xtikβk + νti with i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T
with αti = α + µi + λt, where α denotes the overall intercept, µi and λt represent the
unobservable unit and time specific effects, respectively. By now, it proves convenient to
rewrite the model in matrix notation.
y = eNTα + (IN ⊗ eT )µ+ (eN ⊗ IT )λ+Xβ + ν (3.19)
We assume that following conditions hold:
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• The disturbances νti are distributed IID(0, σ2ν) with 0 < σ2ν <∞ and finite fourth
moments. In particular, we assume the disturbances to be N(0, σ2ν) distributed.
• The elements of the regressor matrix X are non-stochastic and bounded in absolute
value, the matrix (eNT , X) has full column rank, and the matricesM1−M5 converge
to finite nonsingular matrices as both N and T tend to infinity (independent of the
path on which N and T tend to infinity).
From above we can conclude that Eν = 0 and Eνν′ = σ2νINT .
The above described models can be further categorized according to whether the variable
coefficients are assumed to be fixed or random. The fixed assumption leads to dummy
variable models and ordinary least square estimation, whereas the latter assumption yields
error component models and general least square estimation. However, as we do not use
the random effects model a more detailed description is omitted in contrast to the fixed
effects model.
The fixed effects model
As we are not able to estimate simultaneously α and µ1, . . . , µN , λ1, . . . , λT , we impose
following restrictions:
N∑
i=1
µi =
T∑
t=1
λt = 0.
Let Zµ = [zµ.1, . . . , z
µ
.N ] = IN ⊗ eT and Zλ = [zλ1., . . . , zλT.] = eN ⊗ IT . Substitution of these
restrictions into (3.19) leads to
y = Wδ +Xβ + ν
= Zγ + ν, (3.20)
whereW = [eNT , z
µ
.1−zµ.N , . . . , zµ.N−1−zµ.N, zλ1.−zλT., . . . , zλT−1.−zλT.], γ = [α, µ1, . . . , µN−1, λ1,
. . . , λT−1]′, Z = [W,X], and γ = [δ, β] where Z is a (p× q) matrix and γ is (q× 1) vector
with p = TN and q = T + N +K + 1. Equation (3.20) is now the starting point for the
classical estimator and the Bayes estimator. These two estimators and their statistical
properties are described in Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
The classical estimator
Premultiplying (3.20) with Q0, which wipes out the unit and time specific effects, gives
Q0y = Q0Xβ +Q0µ, (3.21)
as Q0W = 0. This gives a transformed system, where the dimension of the used matrices
is smaller than in (3.20). Solving the normal equations for the OLS estimator we get
following estimators
βˆ = [X ′Q0X]
−1X ′Q0y
αˆ = y.. −
K∑
k=1
x..kβˆk
47
µˆi = y.i − αˆ −
K∑
k=1
x.ikβˆk
λˆt = yt. − αˆ −
K∑
k=1
xt.kβˆk
where y.., y.i and yt. denote the overall, the unit specific and time specific mean of the
dependent variable, respectively. Further x..k, x.ik and xt.k represent the same means for
the independent variables.
Statistical properties of the estimator Under the above given assumptions and
given the fixed effects model is the true one, the fixed effects estimator βˆ is BLUE.
Additionally, the estimators for α, µ, λ and β are consistent, if N and T tend to infinity.
Let νˆ = y − eNT αˆ− (IN ⊗ eT )µˆ− (eN ⊗ IT )λˆ−Xβˆ, then
σˆ2ν =
νˆ′νˆ
(N − 1)(T − 1) −K
=
1
(N − 1)(T − 1) −K
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
νˆ2ti
is an unbiased and consistent estimator for σ2ν .
3.2.3 The Bayesian estimator
Bayesian models go back to the Bayesian theorem which says that given two arbitrary
events A and B from the sample space S the following holds:
Pr(B)Pr(A|B) = Pr(AB) = Pr(A)Pr(B|A) (3.22)
(3.23)
from which follows
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A)
Pr(B)
Pr(B|A) (3.24)
and analogous we can write for data and density functions
Pr(θ|Data) = Pr(θ)
Pr(Data)
Pr(Data|θ) (3.25)
The Normal-Gamma Regression Model In this section I follow Hamilton 1994 [23],
Judge et al. 1988 [29] and Zellner 1971 [57] to give a brief introduction in Bayesian
estimation of a classical linear regression model with unknown variance. Consider the
regression model as it is given by the second line of Equation (3.20). The common
Bayesian approach to the estimation of this regression equation is to assume that the
joint prior density function of γ and σ2ν follows a normal-gamma distribution. In terms
of the reciprocal value of the variance of the disturbances - known as the precision - the
normal-gamma distribution is given by:
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f(γ, σ−2ν |Z) = f(γ|σ−2ν , Z)f(σ−2ν |Z) (3.26)
where f(γ|σ−2ν , Z) is defined by the normal distribution N(γ¯, σ2νΩ¯). Further f(σ−2ν |Z) is
defined by the gamma distribution Γ(a¯, b¯). The vector γ¯ represents the analysts prior
information about the coefficients of the regression model and Ω¯ its confidence in that
guess. The parameters a¯ and b¯ of the gamma distribution describe the prior information
about the variance of the disturbances. The sample likelihood f(y|γ, σ−2ν , Z) is defined
by the normal distribution N(Zγ, σ2ν) and hence the joint posterior of γ and σ
−2
ν is given
by
f(γ, σ−2ν |y, Z) = f(γ|σ−2ν , y, Z)f(σ−2ν |y, Z)
where the posterior density of γ conditional on σ−2ν is N(γ¯, σ
2
νΩ¯) and therefore
f(γ|σ−2ν , y, Z) =
1
(2πσ2)p/2
√
|Ω¯| exp
{
[− 1
2πσ2
](γ − γ¯)′Ω¯−1(γ − γ¯)
}
with
γ¯ = (Ω¯−1 + Z ′Z)−1(Ω¯−1γ¯ + Z ′y)
Ω¯ = (Ω¯−1 + Z ′Z)−1
The marginal posterior density of σ−2ν is Γ(a¯, b¯):
f(σ−2nu |y, Z) =
σ−2[(a¯/2)−1]ν (b¯/2)
a¯/2
Γ(a¯/2)
exp

−b¯σ
−2
ν
2

 (3.27)
with
a¯ = a¯+ q
b¯ = b¯+ (y − Zg)′(y − Zg) + (g − γ¯)Ω−1(Z ′Z +Ω−1)−1Z ′Z(g − γ¯)
where g = (Z ′Z)−1Zy is the classical OLS estimator for γ. The marginal posterior density
function for γ is a q-dimensional t-distribution with q degrees of freedom and given by:
f(γ|y, Z) = Γ[(q + a¯)/2]
(πa¯)q/2Γ(a¯/2)
√
| b¯
a¯
Ω¯|

1 + 1a¯(γ − γ¯)′(
b¯
a¯
Ω¯)−1(γ − γ¯)


−
q+a¯
2
(3.28)
From Equations (3.27) and (3.28) the following Bayesian estimates for the unknown pa-
rameters γ and σ−2ν can easily be derived:
E(σ−2ν |y, Z) = b¯/a¯
E(γ|y, Z) = γ¯
Note that for diffuse prior information, which is represented as a¯ = b¯ = 0 and Ω¯−1 = 0
the above equations reduce to the well known OLS estimates for γ and σ−2ν .
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Testing for Fixed Effects
To check for the existence of fixed unit and/or time specific effects we test the following
three hypothesis:
H10 : µ1 = . . . = µN−1 = λ1 = . . . = λT−1 = 0.
H20 : µ1 = . . . = µN−1 = 0.
H30 : λ1 = . . . = λT−1 = 0.
In order to do so we simply employ a F-test. Let R be a (m×k) matrix where R is formed
according to the restrictions which are imposed by the three hypothesis above where m
is the number of restrictions. Then m equals N + T − 2 for H10 , N − 1 for H20 and T − 1
for H30 respectively.
The Classical F-Test In the context of the classical estimator for γ and under the H0
that Rγ = 0 the test statistic
FC =
(Rg)′[R(Z ′Z)−1R′]−1(Rg)/m
(y − Zg)′(y − Zg)/(p− q) (3.29)
is F (m, p− q)-distributed. Here again, g = (Z ′Z)−1Z ′y is the classical OLS estimate for
γ.
The Bayesian F-Test In contrast to the classical statistican a Bayesian regards Rγ
as a random variable. The probability that Rγ = 0 is related to the probability that an
F (m, a¯) variable would assume the value
FB =
(Rγ¯)′(RΩ¯R′)−1(Rγ¯)/m
b¯/a¯
Note again that under a diffuse prior the Bayesian F-statistic reduces to the classical one
- apart from the correction for degrees of freedom in the numerator of Equation (3.29).
3.2.4 Demand in export markets
In the preceding section I derived the properties of the econometric models. I will now
turn to the application of these models. First I will give a short overview of the highlights
of the developments on several export markets and then present the results from the
estimation efforts.
Japan Japan imports roundwood from various countries which comprises 75% of its to-
tal wood supply. However, after a long period of over-cutting in the supplying countries,
the forest resources have been degraded and sustainable management of theses forests is
being strongly demanded. The forest policy in supplier countries has been moving in the
direction of limiting wood harvesting and exports due to concerns for the environment and
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degradation of forest resources. Exporting countries are now trying to promote domestic
timber industries. Thus, imports from these countries to Japan will continue to decrease,
and especially imports of logs will be severely limited.
In the eyes of the Japanese forest industry, forest resources of Russia are still abundant
and can be readily developed. There is a long history of Russian-Japanese trade in forest
products. After World War II imports of Russian wood increased dramatically. In 1973,
roundwood imports from the USSR reached 9.2 million cubic meter. Thereafter, however,
the price of Soviet wood started to rise rapidly. Soviet logs were soon out-competed by
North American logs. Also the quality of Soviet logs declined remarkably, especially from
the early 1980s on and onwards. In addition, the composition of species of logs imported
from the USSR continued to fluctuate, causing disruption to the market. This is a feature
that is of great importance for Japanese timber markets since joinery and home building
follow strong traditions.
Although Japanese-Russian wood trade has indicated negative trends in recent years,
there has been some progress as a result of negotiations between Japan and Russia (Rus-
sian Far East Update 1997 [52]). The accuracy of scaling of logs has improved and prices
are now negotiated for each shipment. However, the fundamental problems of Japanese-
Russian wood trade have not been resolved. Supply instability and the failure to sort
by species and grades continue to present obstacles to increase use of Russian logs in the
Japanese market(Kakizawa 1994 [21]). Russian wood is used mainly for construction pur-
poses. In principal Russian wood would be equally preferred to its competitors. However,
due to degregation of wood quality, the lack of sorting logs by species and grades in Rus-
sia, old-fashioned Russian port facilities, unreliability of Russian traders, and finally the
unwillingness of Japanese consumers to change their preconception about quality stan-
dards leaves Russian logs largely non-competitive.
It is very likely that the trend of establishing Russian-Japanese joint woodworking plants
will continue. Exporting more value-added products will create more jobs in Russia, help
the Russian economy and help Japanese importers to minimize the problems identified
above. Moreover, it seems that joint companies tend to make more efficient use of the
valuable raw material wood. If this trend will persist the Russian market share will
increase in all products.
South Korea Korea has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world for
the last three decades. Korea due to its cheap and disciplined labor resource has built
an export oriented industrial structure. Korea, however, is poorly endowed with natural
resources. Nonetheless, Korea was able to build a sizeable forest industry. The dominant
pattern of the forest industry in the 1960s to 1970s was importing hardwood logs from
South East Asia and exporting mainly to North America mostly in the form of low-value
bulky products such as plywood. The forest industry and exports of forest products con-
tinued to grow throughout the 1970s. The trend was halted in 1980 by a log export ban
in Indonesia, the major supplier of hard wood logs to Korea. Although exports of forest
products have sharply declined since 1980, Korea has continued to import large amounts
of logs for its growing economy, now mainly for its domestic use. The internalization rate
of wood import went up from 43% in 1969 to 97% in 1990 (Kwang Il Tak 1994a [48]).
At present, virtually all wood demand is derived from domestic consumption. On the
supply side, the limited land base and growing stock in Korea could not meet the soaring
wood demand boosted by the economic growth of the country. The average annual share
of domestic wood supply between 1968 and 1990 was only 16% of total timber demand.
The average annual growth rate of timber demand for the period from 1968 to 1990 was
6.5%. If this situation continues the self-sufficiency ratio will continue to fall and Korea
will have to continue to rely on imports to meet rising domestic demand.
Korea has traditionally imported from few major sources. Hardwoods were mainly im-
ported from Indonesia and Malaysia, and softwood from the United States. When Indone-
sia banned log exports in 1980 Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Chile, and New
Zealand emerged as new supply sources to Korea for hardwood and softwood respectively.
In 1991 and 1993, when harvest operations were significantly reduced at the Pacific Rim
of the United States and prices increased dramatically, Chile and New Zealand took over
the market share from the United States. Whenever shifts in the market structure took
place, the main force behind the change was changes in the relative prices. This obser-
vation can also be confirmed by our econometric analysis. The estimated price elasticity
shows a steep gradient and is statistically and economically well different from zero. Price
increases were driven mainly by short supply, which stems form either environmental con-
cerns or protection of own industries in supplying countries. Price is such a powerful
driving force in Korea that the shift of suppliers is not only taking place among suppliers
of one kind of comparable species but even between different species. For example, hard-
wood logs have been gradually replaced by softwood due to relative price changes in the
1980s.
The geographic vicinity of Korea to the Russian forest resource base suggests that now,
in times of changed political relations, the Russian Far East in particular could become
one of the major timber suppliers to Korea. In the late 1980s, when Korea and the former
USSR were paving the way for formal diplomatic ties, the Russian Far East was added
to the new supply sources of softwood. Russian logs began to be imported in 1990. Rus-
sian imports have increased by more than 10 times since from 1991 to 1994. Russia held
already a sizable market share of about 13% in 1994.
Despite the fact that Korea’s total wood consumption has increased impressively the
wood consumption per capita has almost stagnated for the last 20 years. The growth in
population and industrial activity made the total wood consumption grow. This growth
pattern is believed to prevail according to Kwang-Il Tak (1994b)[47]. His expected scenario
for the position of Russian logs in the Korean market is that Russian log prices maintain
their current levels i.e. more expensive than the New Zealand and Chilenian log (pinus
radiata), but less expensive than the United States log. In this case, the log imports
will largely consist of low grade Russian pulpwood, which supply will be constrained by
Russian export taxes. Under this scenario, Russian logs will make up between 15% and
20% of total annual softwood log imports, or between 1.2 and 1.6 million cubic meter.
Under the optimistic scenario, that is, if Russian logs would be competitive to U.S. logs
only by having over 30% price difference the market share will increase up to 30% to
50% of total softwood log imports by the year 2000. In terms of volume this would mean
between 2.4 million and 4 million cubic meters.
The estimated parameters of the one-way fixed effects model for the country group 13
Japan and Korea are shown in table 3.1,and table 3.2
Interestingly, the GNP import coefficient for roundwood, see table 3.1, is even negative.
Decreasing roundwood imports with increasing GNP per capita might be due to increased
imports of finished or semi-finished timber products since total consumption of all timber
13The panel forming this country group comprised time series of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malasia, Mongolia, Philipines, Singaure, and Thailand.
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Table 3.1: Estimated GNP and price coefficients for the roundwood import equation of
Japan and Korea - ρ = 0.5657 and R2 = 0.95.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value
ln GNP -17.219 10.699 -1.609 .11087
Price -.34544 .54581E-01 -6.329 .00000
Table 3.2: Estimated GNP and price coefficients for the lumber import equation of Japan
and Korea - ρ = 0.4998 and R2 = 0.93.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value
ln GNP 27.229 1.8807 14.478 .00000
Price -.12116E-02 .34053E-02 -.356 .72306
products increase. This hypothesis is supported by a rather high elasticity of GNP per
capita on lumber imports (see table 3.2), which can be regarded as a semi-finished product.
In contrast to roundwood imports, lumber imports by Japan and Korea are rather price
inelastic. This suggests that a price shock on the international roundwood market might
trigger a demand shock for timber products in these countries. Further investigations
would be necessary to clarify this and related questions.
There are still a number of institutional questions to be resolved which are mainly related
to trade and investment issues and are to some extend described in Kwang-Il 1994b [47]
and Backman 1996 [3]. It is the institutional uncertainty that deters brokers and investors
to meet the opportunities on the Russian timber and timber products market.
China China is still under a more or less central planned economy and as it can be fore-
seen today, this situation will change only gradually. An econometric approach should
therefore only partially be applied to make forecasts of import of timber and timber prod-
ucts.
Although China has a rather high self-sufficiency ratio, growing demand will only be cov-
ered by imports due to a decline of natural forests and a decline in mature forests. China
currently tries to stimulate internal production by establishing plantations with fast grow-
ing species. This program is paralleled by efficiency improvement measures increasing the
level of comprehensive utilization. In 1983, China imposed the ”Regulations for Eco-
nomical and Rational Application of Wood and Wood substitutes” as a means of limiting
demand for timber. Timber is still included in the ”InterimMethod of Quota Management
of Imports of General Products”. Timber was considered as a ”Class 1 Commodity” of
’strategic’ national importance (MOFTEC regulations November 1994)(Waagener et al.
1996 [53]). These measures should avoid strong import dependence of this large economy,
where small changes in the per capita consumption pattern might have dramatic effects
on the Pacific Rim wood and wood products market. Prices would increase dramatically
if China would liberalize its import regulations and thus harm the overall trade balance
of the country.
China has historically had preferential tariff structure favoring the import of unprocessed
timber with increasingly higher tariff rates for semi-processed and finished products. How-
ever, very recently China departed from its rigid position to favor domestic manufacturing
of wood raw materials. At the November 1995 meeting of APEC in Osaka; China an-
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nounced its intention to greatly reduce tariff rates. The published rates in January 1996
were generally low, the higher rates of processed timber were initially higher and were
proposed for reductions which were much more modest. However, exemptions from the
general rule are possible in the case of Russia. There are a number of special barter
and labor-export agreements with Russia. Government officials indicate that this could
be ’resolved’ in the case of trade with Russia, although no clear policy appears to exist
dealing with such issues.
Besides the obvious trading advantages of China to intensify trade of forest products with
Russia there are still serious obstacles to be removed before Russia can be expected to
supply significant volumes. Chinese importers feel that Russian trade is not ’trustable’ in
terms of quality per orders, timely delivery and other details of trade agreements. Timber
from Russia is small in size and China prefers large timber. However, this problem is in
principal only of technical nature and can be resolved by adequate processing and the
technical properties of Russian wood is at least equal to its competitors. The role of
finance and credit arrangements is perhaps the most important feature impeding trade.
As noted by Waagener et al. 1996 [53], projected near-term exports from Eastern Russia
(East Siberia and Far East) will in all likelihood remain in the range of 5 - 10 million
cubic meters, primarily as unprocessed timber. China is not demanding in quality, nor
will China pay a premium price paid by other Pacific Rim buyers. Increased trade in
lumber and panel products are according to the authors unlikely. However, limited im-
ports of newsprint and cardboard stocks from Russia indicates that such trade is feasible.
China is facing severe shortage of both wood-based pulp as well as a broad range of paper
and paperboard products. On the other hand, growing consumption within Russia and
limited production capacity in Eastern Russia will, however, continue to constrain trade
in pulp and paper products.
Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan Historically, the Central Asian republics
of the former USSR have relied on Russia to supplement domestic roundwood supplies.
Imported roundwood represented up to almost 100% of the commercial roundwood supply
in some regions (see table 3.3). In Kazakhstan, due to its own resources, which is to almost
50% deciduous, the import share is not as high.
Table 3.3: Import share of regional consumption of all of Central Asia and Kazakhstan
Source: Backman (1996)
Lumber Panel Products
1989 1992 1993 1989 1992 1993
Central Asia 0.72 0.77 0.81 0.96 0.96 0.96
Kazakhstan 0.24 0.41 0.28 0.47 0.54 0.41
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According to Backman 1996 [4] Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics will con-
tinue to be net importers of wood fiber under five different GDP growth assumptions.
Roundwood exports have dramatically decreased after 1989. According to data form
Backman(pers. comm) exports declined from 1989 in three years to one fifth of its previ-
ous level. Central Asian economies have seen a dramatic downturn. Real GNP persisted
to decline well after 1995 (Arynovea 1996 [8]). Additionally, wealth is very unevenly dis-
tributed in these countries. This suggests that the purchasing power of potential final
consumers of timber and timber products decreased even more rapidly. The consumption
of lumber is closely correlated with developments in the construction sector. In Kaza-
khstan, for example, construction of housing continued to decline despite the existence of
a powerful construction sector. In 1993, cement output fell by 38.5% and brick output by
18.5%. Housing construction dropped by 24% in 1993. The decline in the construction
of hospitals and schools was even steeper. On a net basis lumber exports to Central Asia
increased as can be seen in table 3.4 14.
The central Asian market is and always was dominated by suppliers fromWestern Siberia
Table 3.4: Export to Central Asian countries from the Russian federation Source:
Goskomstat 1996.
NPT NPT Lumber Lumber
1994 1995 1994 1995
Kasakhstan 348,1 230,3 18584,3 19718,5
Kirgisia 13,2 8,5 1639,9 2387,0
Tadtschikistan 7,2 14,9 1510,6 3848,0
Turkmentistan 5,4 0,5 2996,0 2650,4
Usbekistan 103,2 43,5 17736,1 17147,3
and the Western part of East Siberia (Voevoda 1985 [26]. The Tomsk region, for exam-
ple, holds a very high market share in Central Asia. According to data from the local
Goskomstat(1996) and federal Goskomstat (1996) [17] and Investitiony pasport (1996) [6]
the market share of Tomsk in the roundwood market was 47% in 1994 and 52% in 1995.
Also on the lumber market Tomsk was able to increase its market position by a growth
rate of 7.7% in 94/95. Large volumes are traded on the bases of tender auction contracts
with Ministries or municipalities in these countries. Barter is the prevailing way of trade.
Joint ventures were and are about to be established to increase direct sales. Official prices
of timber products in Central Asia are 2-4 times higher than the local prices in Siberia.
The furniture market seems to be underdeveloped. Italian designed furniture costs 3 to 4
times as much as one would pay in Western Europe.
With increasing wealth the former Central Asian republics will have to cover increasing
consumption almost entirely by imports due to the lack of own resources. There are
generally few data available and little analytical work done on the projection of future
consumption and trade pattern of timber products. In this case, I will just rely on rule
of thumb estimations with the support of the modeling exercise by Backman (1996).
Middle Eastern countries Trade of forest products to Middle Eastern countries is
a rather new phenomenon and has never really shown up in any international statistics.
There is little material available on how successful Russian timber products can be sold
14’NPT’ stands for Non-processed timber (’000’ CUM) and ’Lumber’ in (’000’ US$).
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on these markets. There are already a number of joint ventures implemented. These joint
ventures range from simple trade cooperations to joint small-scale sawmilling up to capital
investment in leading large-scale sawmills. The Middle Eastern wood products market
is paying high prices. As it seems currently, Iranian, Turkish, and other international
timber brokers take advantage in these markets due to the limited knowledge of Russian
producers and traders. Russian exports are expected to rapidly grow in the short- to
medium-term future.
Western and Central Europe Prior to 1991 the Soviet Union was a major supplier
of timber products to Eastern and Central European countries. This is especially true
for Bulgaria (wood, pulp, newsprint), Hungary (wood, sawnwood, pulp, newsprint), East
Germany (wood, sawnwood, pulp) and Poland (pulp, paper) who received substantial
amounts from “mother” Russia. Russia was also a major supplier of wood and pulp to
the Baltic area (Eronen 1996) [15]. It is unlikely that these countries will source their
timber from distant regions in Siberia. However, significant amounts of timber are traded
through these countries to the international market. Russia has also delivered substantial
amounts of roundwood to Finland, Austria, Sweden, Italy and Germany (see Stakhov
et al. 1996 [44]). However, mainly due to dramatically increasing transportation costs,
Russia has lost its competitiveness on these markets. According to the Austrian foreign
trade statistics (Holzkurier 1995 [7]) roundwood imports form the CIS fell in 1993 by
75%. Imports of lumber and panel products, on the other hand, increased in volume.
The volumes imported from Siberia are probably minimal.
The main importer of roundwood is Finland with a share of 39.1% of all Russian exports
in 1994. The loss in competitiveness of Russian logs is due to mainly three factors. (1)
Most of the wood exported was used as pulpwood where price is the determinate of com-
petitiveness. (2) Especially Scandinavian producers are nowadays hesitant to rely too
much on the still cheap Russian wood due to the lack of non-sustainable forestry prac-
tices in Russia. The market success on European markets increasingly depends on the
implementation of eco-certification. A system of eco-labeling might soon be introduced in
Europe where the woodworking industry has to proof that the timber used stems from cer-
tified forests according to European standards. Despite somewhat uncoordinated efforts
of Russian organizations to create a Russia-made certification program Russian logging
methods will not live up to international standards. (3) Uncertain institutional setting
in Russia causes additional costs due to day-to-day trouble shooting, and is frequently
quoted as the largest impediment in the trade and investment with Russia.
Siberia has a high share of pine forests of high timber value. Timber from these pine
forests is valued for its fine textured wood with evenly distributed growth rings and its
small, well dispersed and firmly bound up knots. Also, birch is valued for its strength
and light color for furniture production. There are still comparable small amounts of
sawnwood and unprocessed timber exported from Siberia to Western Europe. Most of it
is roughly edged or other processed timber products. The main importer countries for
lumber are the UK and Germany.
As we can see from table 3.5 containing data form FAO 1996a,b [9] [51] differences in
prices are substantial (46% in 1995) between sawnwood from Canada and Russia. How-
ever, there are little differences in the wood quality. However, Russian lumber is badly
dried, if at all, and usually the quality delivered, reliablity and additional services do
not correspond to Canadian standards. Personal communication with European traders
showed that they are impressed by the high quality of Siberian timber, but regret the
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Table 3.5: Import prices of sawnwood (coniferous) to the United Kingdom from the
Russian Federation and Canada (US$)(Source: FAO 1996a,b)
Year Russian Federation Canada
1993 154 228
1994 182 270
1995 196 287
wasteful, inefficient and low quality production scheme.
Recent trade statistics of exports from Russia to European countries show that there is
a clear trend of Western Europeans to import more value added products from Russia.
However, the fact that the GNP elasticity of roundwood imports (table 3.6) is larger than
the elasticity for lumber import (table 3.7) suggests that there is a tendency to increase
the value per unit transported.
Table 3.6: Estimated GNP and price coefficients for the roundwood import equation of
Western Europe - ρ = 0.7437 and R2 = 0.82
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value
ln GNP 61.553 20.842 2.953 .0033
Price -.1213 .5693E-01 -2.130 .0337
Table 3.7: Estimated GNP and price coefficients for the lumber import equation of West-
ern Europe - ρ = 0.5236 and R2 = 0.93
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value
ln GNP 34.503 3.6453 9.465 .00000
Price -.46208E-01 .76345E-02 -6.053 .00000
There is hardly any import information available for Eastern European countries. This
lead me to resorted to estimate consumption by using the Baysian approach (see table 3.8).
As a first step I estimated a two-way error component regression model for roundwood
consumption of Western Europe and used the coefficients as priors for the consumption
equation estimated for Eastern Europe. Unfortunatly, it is beyond the scope of this study
to make estimations of the import demand of this country group. For the model exercise
the coefficients for consumption are equally treated as elasticities for import from Siberia
which by itself does not seem to be implausible for the Ukrain for expample 15.
3.2.5 Domestic consumption
There is little known on domestic consumption of timber and timber products. Especially,
the most recent Russian publications give testimony of this fact (Burdin 1997 [37], and
15Future research has to be conducted by modeling world trade in order to give better predicition on
import / export flows.
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Table 3.8: Estimated GNP and price elasticities for the roundwood consumption equation
of Eastern Europe using the elasticities of Western Europe as prior information - Baysian
two-way error component random effects model R2 = 0.96
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio p-value
ln GNP 87.601 112.73 0.777 .84
Price -0.221 0.40 -0.547 0.86
constant 588.057 2064.44 0.284 0.87
Rykounina 1997 [27]). The currently most comprehensive studies available are by Back-
man on fiber flows and physical accessibility. The methodology indirectly refers back to
final consumption based on regional disintegrated data of aggregate forest product groups.
His expertise is published in Backman 1994 [1], Backman 1995 [2], Backman 1996 [3], and
Backman forthcoming [5]. Some regional studies on forest product markets have been
conducted by Obersteiner 1996 [35], Obersteiner 1997 [36], Hedeselskabet 1995 [24]. Also
the World Bank indicates that the assessment of the internal consumption pattern is one
of the most urgently needed studies for the Forest Sector of Russia (The World Bank
1997 [10]). Currently IIASA is conducting a study on this subject.
In the framework of the model, consumption is treated as consumption of forest products
by up-stream industry and consumption by final consumers.
Consumption by up-stream industry Consumption is modeled by taking a top-
down approach. We first determine the production pattern of final producers given as a
set of assumptions and forecasts of industry specific variables as discussed in section 2.
The supply pattern of raw-materials to the woodworking industry becomes a function of
the raw-material demand of the woodworking industry given its trajectory of production.
In this dissertation I will, however, only present results on lumber production. In prin-
ciple, the model works such that the distribution of production is first calculated for the
woodworking industry and in a second step these production figures enter as demand in
the roundwood model. However, as already discussed, I present results of lumber produc-
tion using a central gravity approach. In the case of roundwood / lumber co-production,
economically free capacities of roundwood production can be used to compete on the final
domestic market or on the export markets. Thus, in the model, a priory domestic demand
for raw-material supply is given priority.
Demand for internal final consumption The IIASA GIS database system allows
the calculation of distances of producers to the closest towns. We were able to obtain
population data for individual towns, which enables us, after determining the approximate
per capita consumption of timber products, to localize consumption centers.
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Chapter 4
Scenarios
Most emphasis so far has been on model building, but now I shall turn to illustrate the
model by different scenarios for the saw milling industry. The scenarios are illustrated in
two ways. First I present the path of capacities (see for scenario I figure 4.4) and output
(see for scenario I figure 4.3) of individual firms over time. In addition, I present supply
slacks i.e. unsatisfied demand due to under-capacities dedicated to various markets (see
for scenario I figure 4.5 for export markets, 4.7 for West- and East Siberian markets,
and 4.5 for Far Eastern markets), price development (see for scenario I figure 4.6 for ex-
port markets, 4.8 for West- and East Siberian markets, and 4.11 for Far Eastern markets),
and the investment path for foreign and domestic investment 4.11. Second, I present the
cross-sectional results by plotting the simulation results of capacities on the geographic
map of Siberia. Results are only presented for Scenario I were in figure 4.30 I show the
initial distribution of capacities, in figure 4.31 five periods after, and in figure 4.32 ten
periods after the initial state.
4.1 SCENARIO I
Scenario I is considered to be the base line scenario. In the description of the baseline case
I pin down the parameter values of all parameter that occurred in the previous sections on
model building. Further, I list variables which were previously discussed. I distinguish be-
tween endogenous and exogenous variables. Some endogenous variables, however, needed
to be given a starting value and form a separate set.
Let me now briefly examine some of the results of scenario I-the baseline case. Figure 4.3
shows the supply pattern of individual firms over ten periods. The first year can be re-
garded as a self-calibration phase in the modeling process. This can be seen by looking
at changes in the supply pattern from period one to period two. In period two there
are ’suddenly’ new enterprises popping up, despite the fact that there are no investments
observed (see figure 4.11). These new enterprises are in fact old enterprises of gigantic
size (see figure 4.4) and can only enter later when they resized and thus become cost
competitive. This already happens in period two due to the high depreciation rate of
unused capital. The effective total depreciation rate for these enterprises is δt×δ∗t = 0.54.
This high depreciation rate is backed by the empirical fact, that these giants had to resize
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considerably by closing production lines in the real world.
Following this somewhat artificial process in period one, we can observe two processes
that drive industry evolution. The first process can be called resizing the second reloca-
tion. The latter describes changes in the location of production whereas resizing can be
described as adaption of existing firms to an ’optimal’ size guaranteeing competitiveness.
One can clearly observe that most of the giants are still forced to down-size in order to
get closer to their optional size defined by the model technology, input and transportation
costs. Some producers even have to exit the market due to their unfavorable geographic
position or production scheme. Contrarily, in period four new enterprises are emerging
and other enterprises start to add new capacities. The expansion of certain enterprises is
due to losses of capacities of competing firms, foreign investment in the dynamic phase
from period three to period four, and increased demand. After period three the industry
resized to such an extent that oversupply vanished as a market phenomenon and demand
and supply start to equilibrate 1.
Next we come to the phase of relocation. Firms depending on their competitive position
either have to further down-size whereas others are able to expand. New capital additions
of firms are starting to be financed by retained capital. Analysis of the trajectories of
supply and capacities of individual saw mills reveal common patterns. This pattern is
characterized by the continuous tendency of the industry to be structured around the
optimal size. The optimal size, in this setting, is mainly determined by the parameters
determining costs at time T . Here again most crucial are the indicators ’years of logging’ 2
and ’terrain factor’ (see changes of these parameters in the Scenario II and Scenario III).
Supply slacks can occur for several reasons. The two most important reasons are (1)
the rapid depreciation of old capacities and depreciation of unused capacities causing a
’natural’ gap between supply and demand (2) and changes in the relative prices among
markets. Let me illustrate the latter by referring to a situation where for example prices
to Japan increase more rapidly than prices gained at the Chinese market causing a run
for the Japanese market. This causes export demand to China be left unsatisfied due to
a lack of capacities installed. In such a situation more gravity is on the Japanese market
compared to the previous period. This change in gravity causes a supply gap between
capacities installed in Siberia and total demand on the Chinese market if capacities are
limited as they are from period three onwards.
List of variables and parameters
Static phase and calculation of the quasi optimal state
In the previous sections I discussed the model and the model parameters in great detail.
Here I will do only two things. First, I categorize some of the variables and parameters
as already discussed at the beginning of this section. Secondly, I define parameter values.
The list of exogenous and endogenous variables used for the calculation of SCENARIO I
1It is probably more accurate to say that there is a tendency that market forces are equilibrated. As
already discussed we find price stickiness in the model and in addition investment lags the supply gap.
2This is the number of years a lumber mill operates in a certain area. After this period the mill is
assumed to move and start operation in a new area with again 100 percent forest cover.
60
is as follows:
Endogenous variables
Endogenous variables can be defined as variables that are completely determined by the
model’s parameters and variables for the first period:
Yijtk . . .Output of producer i which is delivered to market j
at time t in the kth tender
endogenous variable that had to be given a starting value
Ωijt . . .Coefficient of comparative non-technological scale effects
of producer i at market j at time t(see equation 2.1
P¯jtk . . .Vector of maximum total cost at market j where
transaction is allowed at time t in the kth iteration
Table 4.1: Base price P¯jtk (US $ per CUM) in beginning period t = 1 and the first tender
k = 1 and maximum price P¯maxjtk (US $ per CUM) at time t and T (Abbreviations for the
geographic regions are explained in figures 4.1 and 4.2).
EK PE SE NA ZA BL VL YS MA KA DOM
P¯j11 70 70 70 70 70 70 150 150 100 100 50
P¯maxjt
2.5
160 160 160 160 160 160 240 240 120 120 120
P¯max
jT
2.5
120 120 140 140 140 140 240 230 140 140 120
Y¯itx . . .Production capacity of producer i at time t of technology x 3
Exogenous variables
πijkt . . .Profit per unit of producer i at market j
in the kth iteration at time t
πijkt = fpi(CPit , C
T
ijt, P¯jtk, Yijtk)(see also equation 2.7).
CPit . . .Production cost per unit of producer i at time t
CTijt . . .Transportation cost per unit for producer i to market j at time t
Djtk . . .Total tender volume at market j at time t
in the kth iteration
Exogenous parameters
αi . . .Degree of scale effects
γt . . .Random variable drawn from a truncated normal
distribution with E(γt) ≥ 1 and V AR(γt = σγt = 0) at time t
ζjt . . .Coefficient of comparative advantage of new technology Y¯ Nit .
ηjt . . .Degree of profit maximization at market j at time t.
θjt . . .Random number used for market j with E(θjtk) = Ak
and V AR(θjtk) = σθjt at time t for Ak ]0,1]
ωjtx . . .Coefficient for non-technological scale effects of technology x
at market j at time t
Y minij = . . .Minimum contract size
All parameters in table 4.2 are free to choose and were not derived with any kind of
supporting methodology except for previous sensitivity runs to pin down the sensitive
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Table 4.2: Table of exogenous parameters (Abbreviations for the geographic regions are
explained in figures 4.1 and 4.2).
EK PE SE NA ZA BL VL YS MA KA DOM
αi 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2 2 1.3 1.3 1.2
ζjt 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 3 3 3 2 1.2
ηjt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 3
ηjT 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3
At1 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1
AT1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
∆At 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
σθjt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
σθjT 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
∆σθjt 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
ωojt 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.01
ωnjt 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.01
Y minij 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.04
support intervals of the respective parameters. Without going into great detail let me
verbally shortly sketch the content of table 4.2. I will make this point by comparing
behavior of agents at the trading point EK (Ekaterinburg) and VL (Vladivosock). In
Vladivostok buyers are more sensitive to the service coefficient (ηjt). This is especially
true for the quasi-optimal state (ηjt), which crucially determines the firms’ individual
future trajectories of capacities. At the same time sellers are forced to sell off more at
the base price (more generally lower prices) in Ekaterinburg (At1 and A
T
1 ). Transactions
bear more risk in Ekaterinburg (σθjt). For a Japanese trader it is more important to
buy a product produced by new capacity (ζjt) where the size of the producer producing
with new capacity is not of great importance (ωnjt). Contrarily, if a Japanese trader buys
form a producer producing with old technology the trader will prefer to deal with large
producers (ωojt). Individual contracts have to exceed a minimum physical volume of 100
CUM (Y minij )
4.
Indexes
N = 205 Total number of enterprises at products market l
M = 28 Ten export and eighteen domestic trading points
Kt = 100 Number of auctions per period in each simulated period t
KT = 250 Number of auctions for calculation of the optimal allocation
T s = 10 Number of simulated periods
Dynamic phase
Capacity enlargement and Price determination
For the calculation of price changes some changes in the calculation of the equations
discussed in 2.17 were made: If = 0, Et(
∑
i I
pi
ijt+t′|Infpit ) = (t′)
∑
i πijt)|Infpit with Infpit
be equal the constraint set as defined in 2.10 to 2.13, E(ssjlt) = (Et(Dj,t+t′)−∑i Y¯ ijt) +
(Et(Djt−1) −∑i Y ijt− 1). This would mean that agents in the economy when deciding
on price formation are not able to anticipate foreign investments, believe that investment
4Physical output is alway presented in ’000’ CUM.
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out of own resources are equal to the level of the previous period, and finally take the
current supply slack into account in the calculation of the expected supply slack. Overall
the coefficients of the logistic filter were set such that price changes are modeled to occur
rather smooth.
Another very important assumption that is build in the model is that I endogenize in-
vestment such that investment is equal to the difference between demand and the actual
supply to a particular market in the previous period. It would be very interesting if
we were to model investment as an exogenous process and see how capital constraints
would affect the possible future industry structure. The interest rate plays no rule, and
depreciation rates were set such that old technology would ’naturally’ die out gradually
with a low speed and excess capacity would depreciate moderately. 70% of the profits are
retained in order to be invested in lumber production in the future.
Uncertainty does not play a significant role in the base-line case and agents are allowed
to learn relatively fast in terms of their uncertain behavior. The contract modification
factor was set such that the seller in this model is rather selective in choosing the most
profitable contract.
βt = 1 Interest rate
̺t = 0.7 Portion of profits that is reinvested
δt = 0.7 Depreciation of excess capital
δ∗t = 0.9 Depreciation of inherited Soviet-type technology
∆Y¯ min = 60 Minimum invested captal (’000’ CUM)
Y¯T = 250 Maximum size of a production unit
in the optimal state (’000’ CUM)
Ifjt=1 = 0 Outside investment in the first period
Ifjt>1 ≥ 0 Outside investment in subsequent periods calculated by
the non-negative difference between Djt−1 and
∑
i
∑
k Yijkt−1
t′ = 2 Planning time for price calculation
c1 = 0.75 Coefficient of logistic function
c2 = 0.5 Coefficient of logistic function
c3 = −0.5 Coefficient of logistic function
c4 = 1 Coefficient of logistic function
∆+Pjt = 1 Increase in tender price
(U − L)Bjt=1 = 0.003 Initial uncertainty level of the buyer
(U − L)Sjt=1 = 0 Initial uncertainty level of the seller
ιB = 0 Scaling factor for adjustment of uncertainty of the buyer
ιS = 0 Scaling factor for adjustment of uncertainty of the seller
υBjt =
1
t
Learning coefficient in uncertainty for buyers
υSjt =
1
t
Learning coefficient in uncertainty for sellers
rl = 0.4 Contract modification factor for sellers
Cost Model
In the base-line case I model taxes and other input costs as they seem to be valid for saw
mills and roundwood production in Siberia. The tax rate, overhead cost estimation and
other costs were kindly be provided by some enterprise managers at the many excursion
I made to enterprises throughout Siberia in the past years. Engineering indicators were
taken from the literature and corrected as good as possible for the Russian conditions.
63
The two indicators, ’years of logging’ and the ’terrain factor’, vary from simulation and are
used to illustrate effects of changes in the forest management scheme on the production
scheme of this particular industry.
τt = 7.6% Tax rate
Øt = 20% Over head costs
ςHarv = 1.5 Number of working shifts for harvesters
ςFwd = 1.5 Number of working shifts for forwarder
ςTruck = 1.5 Number of working shifts for Trucks
κult = 700 Total cost of one unit of labor
Ølt = 20% Labor specific over head costs
dt = 25% Down time
GSit = glst.txt Growing stock per ha
Tr = glst.txt Problem trees
dHarv = 180 Number of harvester operation days
dHarv = 8 Hours per harvester shift
ℜHarvt 1.2 Productivity factor due to Russian operators
sut(hg) 14 Set-up time between trees
dTruck = 180 Number of truck operation days
dTruck = 8 Hours per truck shift
ℑi = 70 Year of logging
lsi = 1.8 Terrain factor
Croad = 0.00512 Road cost per km
ξ = 1.25 Road maintenance factor for panelizing large enterprises
4.2 SCENARIO II
Compared to the base case Scenario II describes an economy where buyers are more
eager to buy from low cost producers (ηjt, ηjT ). Sellers on the other hand are modeled
to be rather selective in the selection of contracts (rl). Prices are allowed to adjust more
quickly (c3) and the maximum price level (P¯maxjt , P¯
max
jT ) is somewhat lower than in the
base scenario. Most of the returns are retained and positioned for new investment in
lumber production (̺t). Old capacities are difficult to maintain and depreciate rather
quickly (δ∗t ). In addition capacities that were not used also depreciates faster (δt). Taxes
are set to a higher level of 30% and yearly labor costs (κult ) were also chosen to be rather
high. Lumber mills are forced to behave as they would have to operate for 40 years in a
specific area, but harvestable forests are relatively widely dispersed (lsi) suggesting are
more extensive forest management scheme.
These changes are illustrated in the list changed parameters compared to the base line
scenario (Scenario I in section 4.1). The following changes were made in the parameter
values to generate the results for scenario II:
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Figure 4.1: Demand of sawn timber (’000’ CUM) on export markets projected for ten years. Abbre-
viations for the export regions in the legend are as follows: EK = Ekatherinburg, PE = Petropavlovsk,
SE = Semipaladinsk, NA = Nauski, ZAS = Zabaikalsk, Bl Blagovescensk, V L = Vladivastock, Y S =
Yuschni Sachalinsk, MA = Magadan, KA = Petropavlovsk-Kamtschtski.
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Figure 4.2: Demand of sawn timber (’000’ CUM) on domestic markets projected for ten years. Ab-
breviations for regions in the legend are as follows: 1 = Altajskij Kraj,2 = Kemerovskaja oblast,3 =
Novosibirskaja oblast,4 = Omskaja oblast, 5 = Tomskaja oblast,6 = Tyumenskaja oblast,7 = Krasnoy-
askij kraj,8 =Irkutskaja oblast, 9 = Chitinskaja oblast,10 = Republic Buryatia,11 = Republic Tuva,
12 = Primorskij Kraj,13 = Khabarovskij kraj,14 = Amursaja oblast,15 = Kamchatskaja oblast,16 =
Magadanskaja oblast,17 = Sakhalinskaja oblast,18 = Republic Yakutia.
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Figure 4.3: Supply path of individual saw mills over ten years according to Scenario I (Yearly output
in ’000’ CUM sawn timber).
Figure 4.4: Distribution of installed capacities of individual saw mills over ten years according to
Scenario I (Capacities in ’000’ CUM sawn timber).
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Figure 4.5: Supply slacks in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on export markets according to Scenario I.
Figure 4.6: Price path for exported sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM
sawn timber according to Scenario I. Abbreviations in the legend are set as follows: EK = Ekatherinburg,
PE = Petropavlovsk, SE = Semipaladinsk, NA = Nauski, ZAS = Zabaikalsk, Bl Blagovescensk, V L =
Vladivastock, Y S = Yuschni Sachalinsk, MA = Magadan, KA = Petropavlovsk-Kamtschtski.
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Figure 4.7: Supply slacks in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on domestic West- and East Siberian markets
according to Scenario I.
Figure 4.8: Price path for sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM sawn
timber delivered in West- and East Siberia according to Scenario I. Abbreviations in the legend are set as
follows:1 = Altajskij Kraj,2 = Kemerovskaja oblast,3 = Novosibirskaja oblast,4 = Omskaja oblast, 5 =
Tomskaja oblast,6 = Tyumenskaja oblast,7 = Krasnoyaskij kraj,8 =Irkutskaja oblast, 9 = Chitinskaja
oblast,10 = Republic Buryatia,11 = Republic Tuva.
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Figure 4.9: Supply slack in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on the Far Eastern market according to Scenario
I.
Figure 4.10: Price path for sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM sawn
timber delivered in the Far East according to Scenario I. Abbreviations in the legend are set as follows:
12 = Primorskij Kraj,13 = Khabarovskij kraj,14 = Amursaja oblast,15 = Kamchatskaja oblast,16 =
Magadanskaja oblast,17 = Sakhalinskaja oblast,18 = Republic Yakutia.
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Figure 4.11: Total(inv.tot), foreign (inv.f), and investment financed from own profits (inv.pi) over ten
years in ’000’ CUM sawn timber according to Scenario I.
P¯maxjt
2.5
→ P¯
max
jt
2
P¯max
jT
2.5
→ P¯
max
jT
2
ηjt → ηjt ∗ 1.5
ηjT → ηjT ∗ 2.5
̺t → 0.9
δt → 0.5
δ∗t → 0.8
c3 → −0.3
∆+Pjt → 0.7
rl → 0.2
τt → 30%
κult=1 → 7000
ℑi → 40
lsi → 2.5
The main results of scenario II can be stated as follows. From figure 4.13 we see directly
the effect of the depreciation rate of old, inherited capacities (δt). Old capacities die out
faster than in scenario I (compare figure 4.4). There seems to be the same phase struc-
ture of resizing and relocation. Where relocation is more pronounced in scenario II due
to the fact that old mills close earlier. We see also that the producer structure is more
differentiated which is a combined effect of relocation, higher cost differentiation (mainly
driven by the the number of years of logging in the area), and the service optimizing be-
havior of buyers. Figure 4.20 indicates that external industry funding dominates. This is
connected to the fast decline of old capacities and the resulting low profitability, and large
supply gaps which become investment the following period. Supply slacks irrespective of
the markets analyzed are larger in size and show almost the same pattern of fluctuation
compared to scenario I.
Despite the fact that production costs are higher, prices show a smaller spread and are
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Figure 4.12: Supply path of individual saw mills over ten years according to Scenario II (Yearly output
in ’000’ CUM sawn timber).
smaller in absolute value than compared to scenario I. This phenomenon can in part be
explained by the smaller increase of the auction price from one auction to the other and
by the change behavior of the buyers. Except, for Vladivostok and Yushni Sachalinsk the
prices become almost stationary.
4.3 SCENARIO III
In the economy of scenario III buyers are even more concerned about buying from the
least cost producer (ηjt, ηjT ). Sellers on the other hand are not required to be highly
selective. In the selection of contracts (rl) sellers get fewer offers. These offers, however,
are usually from buyers which offer high yield projects on a relative basis. Prices are
allowed to adjust less quickly (c3) and the maximum price level (P¯maxjt , P¯
max
jT ) is some-
what lower than in the base scenario. In the calculation of price changes the following
changes in the calculation of the equations as discussed in 2.17 were made: If = 0,
Et(
∑
i I
pi
ijt+t′|Infpit ) = (t′)
∑
i πijt)|Infpit with Infpit be equal the constraint set as defined
in 2.10 to 2.13, Et(
∑
i I
d
ijt+t′) = 0, E(ssjlt) = Et(Dj,t+t′) −
∑
i Y¯ ijt. This would mean
that agents in this economy, when deciding on price formation, are not able to anticipate
foreign investments, and believe that investment from own resources are equal to the level
of the previous period, further they do not take the current supply slack into account,
and do believe that capital that is installed today will be entirely available tomorrow.
Most of the returns are retained and reserved for new investment in lumber production
(̺t). Old capacities used are maintained at low costs and if used do not depreciate (δ∗t ).
Contrarily, capacities that were not used depreciate at a very fast rate (δt). Taxes are set
to 20% and the yearly labor costs (κult ) were also chosen to be significantly higher than
in the base scenario but higher than in Scenario II. Lumber mills are forced to behave as
they would have to operate for 120 years (the almost sustainable case) and the harvestable
forests are relatively widely dispersed (lsi).
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of installed capacities of individual saw mills over ten years according to
Scenario II (Capacities in ’000’ CUM sawn timber).
Figure 4.14: Supply slacks in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on export markets according to Scenario II.
73
Figure 4.15: Price path for exported sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM
sawn timber according to Scenario II. Abbreviations in the legend are set as follows: EK = Ekatherinburg,
PE = Petropavlovsk, SE = Semipaladinsk, NA = Nauski, ZAS = Zabaikalsk, Bl Blagovescensk, V L =
Vladivastock, Y S = Yuschni Sachalinsk, MA = Magadan, KA = Petropavlovsk-Kamtschtski.
Figure 4.16: Supply slacks on the domestic West- and East Siberian market according to Scenario II.
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Figure 4.17: Price path for sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM sawn
timber delivered in West- and East Siberia according to Scenario II. Abbreviations in the legend are set as
follows:1 = Altajskij Kraj,2 = Kemerovskaja oblast,3 = Novosibirskaja oblast,4 = Omskaja oblast, 5 =
Tomskaja oblast,6 = Tyumenskaja oblast,7 = Krasnoyaskij kraj,8 =Irkutskaja oblast, 9 = Chitinskaja
oblast,10 = Republic Buryatia,11 = Republic Tuva.
Figure 4.18: Supply slack in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on the Far Eastern market according to Scenario
II.
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Figure 4.19: Price path for sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM sawn
timber delivered in the Far East according to Scenario II. Abbreviations in the legend are set as follows:
12 = Primorskij Kraj,13 = Khabarovskij kraj,14 = Amursaja oblast,15 = Kamchatskaja oblast,16 =
Magadanskaja oblast,17 = Sakhalinskaja oblast,18 = Republic Yakutia.
Figure 4.20: Total(inv.tot), foreign (inv.f), and investment financed out of own profits (inv.pi) according
to Scenario II.
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Here again, I only list changes of parameters values compared to the base line scenario
(Scenario I 4.1). The following changes were made:
P¯max
jt
2.5
→ P¯
max
jt
2
P¯max
jT
2.5
→ P¯
max
jT
2
ηjt → ηjt ∗ 2.5
ηjT → ηjT ∗ 3.5
̺t → 0.8
δt → 0.3
δ∗t → 1
c3 → −0.6
∆+Pjt → 0.7
rl → 0.6
τt → 20%
κult=1 → 5000
ℑi → 120
lsi → 2
The foregoing two scenarios were rather similar in the behavior of prices, capacity evo-
lution and supply slacks. Scenario III looks very different form the previous scenarios.
Let me very briefly elaborate on the results of Scenario III. In Scenario III the phases of
resizing and relocation are very different. Resizing takes place in such a way that enter-
prises resize and stick to their production scheme. Outside investment almost completely
dominates. The first large wave comes at the end of period two where there occurs a large
supply gap for Ekaterinburg. Relocation can take place only to a limited extent. Old
companies and the few founded at the end of period two stay rigidly in business, where
increasing demand is taken up by small companies that continuously grow at the rate of
increasing demand.
Prices are more volatile in this economy and reach higher levels. This is mainly due to
the more expensive raw material supply which in turn can be explained by the changes
in the forest management regime.
4.4 GIS representation of SCENARIO I
The option to illustrate the simulation results in a GIS representation is a very important
feature of the entire modeling approach. This gives the user of the model, but also the
practitioner working for industry the possibility to evaluate the plausibility of the results
and also to come up with better policy conclusions. It seems that the human brain is
more capable to process visually represented data than data presented in tables or charts
of more aggregated data. One develops a certain ’feeling’ of what the model does if pa-
rameters change. At the same time one learns how different policy options would affect
the industry.
Figures 4.30 to 4.31 show nicely the patterns of relocation and size adaptation as already
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Figure 4.21: Supply path of individual saw mills over ten years according to Scenario III (Yearly output
in ’000’ CUM sawn timber).
Figure 4.22: Distribution of installed capacities of individual saw mills over ten years according to
Scenario III (Capacities in ’000’ CUM sawn timber).
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Figure 4.23: Supply slacks in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on export markets according to Scenario III.
Figure 4.24: Price path for exported sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM
sawn timber according to Scenario III. Abbreviations in the legend are set as follows: EK = Ekatherin-
burg, PE = Petropavlovsk, SE = Semipaladinsk, NA = Nauski, ZAS = Zabaikalsk, Bl Blagovescensk,
V L = Vladivastock, Y S = Yuschni Sachalinsk, MA = Magadan, KA = Petropavlovsk-Kamtschtski.
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Figure 4.25: Supply slacks in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on the domestic West- and East Siberian market
according to Scenario III.
Figure 4.26: Price path for sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM sawn
timber delivered in West- and East Siberia according to Scenario III. Abbreviations in the legend are set
as follows:1 = Altajskij Kraj,2 = Kemerovskaja oblast,3 = Novosibirskaja oblast,4 = Omskaja oblast, 5 =
Tomskaja oblast,6 = Tyumenskaja oblast,7 = Krasnoyaskij kraj,8 =Irkutskaja oblast, 9 = Chitinskaja
oblast,10 = Republic Buryatia,11 = Republic Tuva.
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Figure 4.27: Supply slack in ’000’ CUM sawn timber on the Far Eastern market according to Scenario
III.
Figure 4.28: Price path for sawn timber over ten years in real constant (1990) US $ per CUM sawn
timber delivered in the Far East according to Scenario III. Abbreviations in the legend are set as follows:
12 = Primorskij Kraj,13 = Khabarovskij kraj,14 = Amursaja oblast,15 = Kamchatskaja oblast,16 =
Magadanskaja oblast,17 = Sakhalinskaja oblast,18 = Republic Yakutia.
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Figure 4.29: Total(inv.tot), foreign (inv.f), and investment financed out of own profits (inv.pi) according
to Scenario III.
discussed in section 4.1 5. The most interesting insight gained from the GIS-representation
of scenario I is the rather strong concentration of enterprises in the area of West and East
Siberia. It seems that this result is due to the predicted demand structure and in part
due to the fact that no green-field sites were allowed in the particular set of scenarios
presented. Many experts would think that on a relative scale Far Eastern regions would
be able to expand more.
5There is currently, however, one problem that is that the size is not plotted continuously but by
categories. Thus the giants are sometimes underrepresented as to their real size and the small enterprises
might on a relative scale appear as too large.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions
Russian industry experienced a serious economic crisis that resulted in a major drop in
output in the forest industry. This caused a dramatic decrease in real employment and
income in forest industry based communities. Especially, in the more distant regions of
Siberia the economic down-turn has been more severe compared to the Russian average.
In addition, Siberia’s forest sector has recently gained considerable international interest
for its environmental problems. So far little is known about the possible future path of
Siberia’s forest sector and its role on the international forest products markets. I have
developed a model that can be used as a decision making tool for policy analysis of var-
ious scenarios and levels of detail analyzing the forest industries of Siberia. The entire
economic system is modeled on the basis of the behavior of individual firms.
The PSFIM was designed to model allocation pattern of the production of individual
producers in the Siberian forest sector during transition from a command economy to an
economy based on market principles. Due to the unplausibility of assumptions built in
standard economic models combined with the possibility to link to an extensive resource
data base, the modeling strategy was to build an easy-to-understand and easy-to-compute
economic model which makes sense and takes maximum use of existing data and expert
knowledge. The model is based on Vickery’s Nobel Prize Winning auction theory in order
to simulate the possible future formation of Russia’s forest industrial sector. In the model
I distinguish between a static phase and a dynamic one. The static phase describes the
auction mechanism, which is applied for each period, leading to a partial market clearing
depending on the producer and price constraints. In the dynamic phase, product prices
adjust, producers invest or depreciate capital, contract partners revise contract policies
and, finally, prices change according to the overall economic development.
Enormous amounts of data from many different sources and expert knowledge have been
compiled and have been woven into the model. The core model is flexible in the sense
that new knowledge or data can rapidly be included. This is usually achieved by to com-
bining other models with the core model. So for example a cost module and a demand
module are attached to the core model in the current version. The cost module calculates
costs as a function of a number of variables starting from forest inventory information,
forest management rules, to harvesting and processing technology. The demand module
predicts demand on the basis of demand functions, which were estimated with the help of
econometric tools. In the current version I developed a Bayesian panel data model, which
has never been developed in the economic literature. Another very important feature of
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the model is that issues of international trade can be addressed. Trade, and especially
international trade flows, not only depends on predicted predicted supply and demand
patterns of importing and exporting regions, but also factors like transportation costs,
loading and reloading costs, tariffs and quotas. The effects of all these factors can be
explored with the PSFIM. In addition, the model is capable to model the effects of differ-
ences in the business approaches of different cultures on the international trade pattern.
As an illustration one can consider a Chinese trade who is more concerned about prices
whereas Japanese markets require high contract reliability and product quality.
It is worth pointing out that the distinguishing feature of the entire modeling approach is
that exchange is not simulated by a very specific class of trade game (i.e. general equilib-
rium or Bertrand competition), but by negotiations in an auction mechanism. Auctions
are simulated using multiple decision criteria with different negotiation capabilities and
market power of individual agents. However, optimizing behavior of any kind can be
treated and implemented as special cases. In addition, I allow for heterogeneity in the
cost structure, and behavior of agents. Depending on the market power of the buyers or
sellers the algorithm either allows the buyers purchase at a low price or the sellers sell
at a high price. Either the producers or the buyers gain relatively more from the trans-
action. An increasing price auction with a reserve price is iteratively conducted until
either producer or buyer constraints are violated. Buyers propose contacts to a selected
subset of sellers, which after a screening of all received contracts decide to accept, modify
or reject the proposals made by the buyers. Due to the nature of the auction set up
it is impossible (also theoretically by backward induction) for the individual agents to
compute their optimal strategy in the auction nor is it possible to compute the optimal
strategy over periods using an inter-temporal optimization procedure. Nonetheless, the
agents’ behavior tends towards a quasi-optimal state in a distant future period.
Typically, output is given at an individual enterprise level of the final product. Trade
flows between individual agents, prices negotiated by individual bargain, supply slacks,
capital formation, profits, investment and many other details can be reported on an indi-
vidual mill or even contract level. Despite the fact that the model was not yet fine tuned,
preliminary results seem to indicate that the model is capable to match reasonably well
the pattern of output decline and relocation. Also price development, especially for export
prices, can almost realistically be reconstructed.
These are all very encouraging results. Nonetheless, the model will still have to be further
extended and fine tuned. The most recent results from theory will have to be continu-
ously incorporated into the model. Especially, there is a need to further strengthen the
theoretic basis for the transition algorithms used in the dynamic phase. Also, empirical
experiments will have to be carried out in order to pin down negotiation behavior across
different cultures.
At this stage it is impossible to foresee the future of the PSFIM. All depends on how this
new modeling approach is accepted by the scientific community and the many possible
practitioners.
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